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I. PREFACE
This paper deals with the definition and implications of globalism
generally and for African interests in particular. Its focus is on globalism as a
cluster of social, economic, and political forces contesting for the controlling
paradigm of international relations and international law. The article
underscores the general issue of globalism's impact on the well-being of the
international community. It also considers the impact of globalism on the
U.N. Charter, and, in particular, the role of the United Nations in
international economic order. The connections between globalism and society
are considered as part of the changing character of war and political economy
in the international system.
A central theme running through this paper is that globalism stresses an
element of privatizing important functions historically considered to be public
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in character. These include the management of important economic issues
and the control and regulation of the global war system. All of these matters
impact Africa. Additionally, it is important for juris consults in Africa to
understand them better so that professionals, scholars, and opinion leaders
may be able to provide African leadership with more skilled, strategic, and
tactical ways to protect the vital interests of Africa.
II. AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A. Introduction: Globalism and Africa-The Simple View
There is a short and simple African perspective on globalism. For Africa,
globalism means the unremitting entrenchment of human deprivation on a
continental scale. Africa also sees its perilously accelerating impoverishment
and deprivation as the dynamic thrust of globalism. 1 In short, the simple
view of globalism reveals a cluster of negative externalities accelerating
African poverty and deprivation. Stability in this global environment has a
special meaning for Africa. It is an illusion which masks a reality of
regressive change and a rapid deterioration of human values. This view is as
dismal as it is challenging. The dismal part may well generate not simply an
African pessimism, but a new round of global Afro-pessimism. The
challenging part of this simplistic view is that merely preserving an unhappy
status quo is not enough; Africa must engage in change that will change the
status quo. That is to say, change dedicated to progress and hope in Africa.
To paraphrase Thabo Mbeki, change for the realization of the African
renaissance.2 Africa represents the sharp edge of globalism's global problem.
In a great irony, Africa's post-apartheid world now inherits the term,
previously confined to a single African country, as a symbol of the continent's
deprivation in the global scheme of things: global apartheid. 3
B. Globalism & Africa: The Comprehensive Complex Perspective
What we have suggested above is a popular but simplistic understanding
and concern about globalism and its global and African discontents. A more
discriminating view of the challenge of globalism for Africa must account for
global conditions, which significantly shape Africa's position in the world
economy. It correspondingly must give an appraisal of Africa's reciprocal
impact on the global community and the critical values that sustain it. Such
an account of globalism requires deft theorizing, powers of description, and
I See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELPOMENT REPORT (2005), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdflHDRO5_complete.pdf (focusing on what governments
in rich countries can do to keep their side of the global partnership bargain).
2 See Winston P. Nagan, Lawyer Roles, Identity, and Professional Responsibility in an Age of
Globalism, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 131 (2001) [hereinafter Lawyer Roles]
3 For a discussion of the term "global apartheid," see generally Joel P. Trachtman, Global Justice:
Poverty, Human Rights and Responsibilities: Welcome to Cosmopolis, World of Boundless
Opportunity, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477 (2007).
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careful analysis. These are challenges to understanding the fundamental
epistemology of globalism in the world community. These challenges are in
part a matter not confined to public policy. The challenges are in effect
scientific and intellectual challenges touching on matters of the political and
social responsibility of both academics and professionals in Africa today.
C. Ubuntu, Community, and Globalism
Intellectual and scholarly responsibility is a part of the challenge of
comprehension. That responsibility includes a commitment to rigorous
scientific research as well as the development of advanced teaching methods
for higher education and particularly the interface of higher education and
professional training. This level of intellectual responsibility is a matter that
confronts critical challenges for the future of Africa and, in a larger sense, the
have-not sector of the world community. As an aside, the focus of an
epistemology of globalism, as understanding the concept of community in its
broadest parameters, local to global, is a distinctively African contribution.
This contribution, with its potentials and deficits, is essential for the human
and African prospect. The critical African gloss on what we mean by human
rights is captured in the term "Ubuntu."4
Ubuntu, in African law5 and political economy, is a term that is not
merely descriptive, but also carries a powerful normative message.
Descriptively, Tbuntu requires us to focus on people. The ultimate focus of
responsible social and legal inquiry is on the human being. The human being
is connected to other human beings in micro-social relationships, which
extend ultimately to communication networks within the family, clan, tribe,
and community. This focus and insight is critical if globalism is to be revealed
so as to understand the nature of the social forces that drive it, are impacted
by it, benefit by it, and most importantly, are victimized by it.6
4See generally Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515,
1540 n.5 (2000).
Archbishop Desmond Tutu has explained the African concept of Ubuntu as
the following: It speaks about the essence of being human: that my humanity
is caught up in your humanity because we say a person is a person through
other persons. I am a person because I belong. The same is true for you. The
solitary human being is a contradiction in terms. That is why God could say
to Adam, "It is not good for man to be alone." No one can be fully human
unless he or she relates to others in a fair, peaceful, and harmonious way. In
our African understanding, we set great store by communal peace and
harmony. Anything that subverts this harmony is injurious, not just to the
community, but to all of us, and therefore forgiveness is an absolute necessity
for continued human existence.
Id.
5 Albie Sachs, War, Violence, Human Rights, and the Overlap Between National and
International Law. Four Cases Before the Sourth African Constitutional Court, 28 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 432, 476 n.15 (2005). "The term ubuntu is not defined in the South African
Constitution." Id.
6 Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15,
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We submit that this descriptive focus, implicit in Ubuntu, provides us
with the most useful orientation of unpacking and understanding globalism
from the vantage point of different academic disciplines and professions. The
other focus, also implicit in Ubuntu, is the normative relationship expressed
in the rough translation that human beings express themselves as human
beings in relation to and interaction with other human beings.7 The
normative implication here is the golden rule of reciprocity, mutual
understanding, and respect, which are the cornerstones of the aspiration of
universal dignity. Globalism, of course, needs to be seen in the context of the
reciprocated dynamics of inter-dependence, inter-determination, and complex
human and associational interaction. The Ubuntu perspective and
orientation may provide a clearer picture of how Africa, and in a larger sense,
the have-nots of the world, might protect and secure their interests in peace
and security, social progress, and human rights. Human rights include the
fundamental right to pursue economic, social, cultural, and legal
development as the pathway to a better future. This formulation of globalism
imposes important challenges for Africa's intellectual, scientific, professional,
and opinion leaders.
When meaningfully discussing globalism in Africa, the first and most
obvious question is: What exactly is meant by the term globalism? Globalism
is used loosely in the media and in ordinary conversation and frequently
15-16 (1998).
It has also been described as a philosophy of life, which in its most
fundamental sense represents personhood, humanity, humaneness and
morality; a metaphor that describes group solidarity where such group
solidarity is central to the survival of communities with a scarcity of
resources, and the fundamental belief is that "ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,
motho ke motho ba batho ba bangwe," which, literally translated, means "a
human being is a human being because of other human beings." In other
words, the individual's existence and well-being are relative to that of the
group. This is manifested in anti-individualistic conduct that threatens the
survival of the group. If the individual is to survive within the group, there
must be collective effort for group survival. Basically, it is a humanistic
orientation towards fellow beings.
Id. (Internal citations omitted).
7 Id.
The meaning of ubuntu, however, becomes much clearer when we examine its
practical effect on everyday life. For example, a society based on ubuntu
places strong emphasis on family obligations. Family members are obliged to
help one another. The concept of family is a broad "nuclear" family, which
includes the extended family. People are willing to pool community resources
to help an individual in need. This is captured in some of the African
aphorisms such as, "motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe," which literally
translated means, "people live through the help of others," and, "a botho ba
gago e nne botho seshabeng," which literally translated means, "let your
welfare be the welfare of the nation."
Id. (Internal citations omitted).
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carries meanings that are both obvious and obscure.8 The term is used widely
in academic discourse, probably most frequently by intellectual leaders in
economics. Nevertheless, the term also is used with precision and careful
attention to detail in fields such as world politics, international relations,
international comparative sociology, international law, and other discrete
disciplines.
This audience is composed largely of lawyers interested in teaching law
in the context of the global environment. To manage the teaching of that
subject effectively, there are two possible vantage points, broad and narrow,
which may be used simultaneously. Both should provide a working picture of
what globalism is, and what we might do to improve and enrich the training
of professionals in law. Incidentally, this focus also should deepen the African
understanding of globalism. More importantly, we must figure out how the
global tiger may be managed so that Africa is not swallowed by it. Instead,
Africa must appropriate its wild and unruly power for the improvement of the
African prospect.
III. DEFINING GLOBALISM FROM AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE:
ROOTING GLOBALISM IN HUMAN RELATIONS
A. Globalism and the Concept of a Global Community.*
The Broad Perspective
The term globalism must assume a social or community context. Since
that community context essentially must be global, we then may delimit the
context of globalism as involving a global community with all the complexity
of cultural diversity, levels of development, disparate levels of power and
authority, as well as security and insecurity. In this global village of
community, human beings may act in groups or complex associations-such
as multi-national corporations, political parties, and pressure groups-whose
activities and actions are manifested beyond the state, or by groups
committed to social deviance such as organized crime cartels and terrorist
networks. This description of the global community takes into account a
range of actors who participate in addition to state actors. Other relevant
socioeconomic organizations with appropriate levels of legal capacity and
identity include related regional trading blocks and developed continental
institutions of governments such as the African Union.
Beyond the African reality and apart from other non-African nation
states, there are the well-developed institutions of international governance
such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary
8 Arjun Appadurai identified five types of global connectivity. Ethnoscapes: the movements of
people; Financescapes: the global flows of money; Ideoscapes: the global flows of ideas and
political ideologies; Mediascapes: the global flows of media images; and Technoscapes: the
movement of technologies around the globe. Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the
Global Cultural Economy, 7 THEORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 295, 295-310 (1990). See also
Lawyer Roles, supra note 2.
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Fund, the World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and
other parallel continental institutions, such as the European Union and the
Organization of American States. In short, we can divide the global village
into state actors, about 195 globally, and non-state actors, which include
commercial and political actors, international non-governmental
organizations, and the cluster of associations and individuals often described
as a global civil society. In this sense, it immediately can be seen that the
important players and actors in global society are complex and
multitudinous. Their forms, functions, and impacts on the human prospect
are vital if one is to get a picture of how one's fundamental values are being
depreciated, protected, or enhanced.
This picture of globalism is one that is not in stark contrast to the
importance and reality of the nation state. It simply reflects the fact that the
nation-state is not the only important player in the context of globalism. The
contextual meaning of globalism can be seen by defining it as a global, social,
political, economic, and legal process in which the primary actors in the
international system project their power and interests. They seek to vindicate
their actions using the techniques important to interest, articulation and
realization, and the security of those interests. These include interests long
codified, recognized, and symbolized as fundamental value concerns facing
humanity: security, cooperation, self-determination and independence, social
progress and development, defense of humanitarianism, and human rights.
The depreciation of human dignity on a colossal scale during World War
II led to the adoption of the U.N. Charter.9 The issue of human rights and
human dignity is one of the important outcomes of the creation of world order
based on the Charter.10 The Charter emphasizes as one of its primary
purposes the achievement of universal dignity under the international rule of
law.11 The Charter recognizes, among other things, that to provide for human
security, humanity must fulfill its commitment to fundamental human
rights, the dignity and worth for the individual, equal rights for men and
women, and equal rights of large and small nations. 12 The Charter recognizes
that its promise, as it seeks to vindicate its high purposes, must be founded
upon the notion of an international rule of law.13 This description of global
social process only can work, at least in terms of the values of human rights
and human dignity, if globalism is not a prescription for anarchy and
oppression. Globalism presents a challenge for law professors, judges,
lawyers, public officials, and those in the private sector who must develop
and evolve appropriate structures of law.
9 See U.N. Charter pmbl.
10 See id.
I See id. at art. 1, para. 3.
12 See id. at art. 1, paras. 2-3.
13 See id. at art. 2.
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B. Defining Globalism as a Gloss on the Sovereignty Prospective:
The Narrow Perspective
The first perspective of globalism must be tempered by a second
concurrent perspective. This second perspective recognizes the importance of
law as a descriptive tool in providing meaning and understanding to the
context of globalism. At the height of the influence of legal positivism on
international law, an elegant and concise way of defining international law
was developed. International law was defined as the rules of law that
operated between coordinate sovereign states. The concept of an
international society could be defined by counting the number of recognized
states in the system and calling the system a community of states upon
which the foundations of modern international law are founded. This was and
remains a powerful model that deeply influences fields such as international
economic law, international relations, international diplomacy, as well as
world politics.
The above model has resisted taking account of the unwashed world of
non-state actors and civil society participants. It is a model that works on the
assumption that all law, including international law, comes from the state,
which is vested with the attribute of sovereignty. This is not a model that
allows a rational inquirer to account for human activity, which cuts across
state and group lines as a critical component of the neat world of positivist
elegance. The more modest view of globalism, seen in the light of the
architecture of conventional international law and its theoretical
underpinnings, is that it is a process that erodes in some degree sovereign
state boundaries, but on the other hand, admits a freer flow of goods, service
capital, finance, labor, technology, science, education, and human migration.
In this sense, global reality is admitted, perhaps grudgingly, because global
reality indeed seems to weaken the omnipotence of the sovereign state by the
erosion of its judicial, political, and economic communications while
expanding social mobility and migration in ways that limit the state's power
to control and regulate. This view of globalism is subversive of the
conventional view of state, law, and governance. However, it is more
moderate in its implicit claim that the state is an institution on the wane.
These two views of globalism contain important components of truth.
They require a degree of reconciliation and integration for us to gain a clearer
picture of this complex phenomena and how it affects the daily lives of the
people of Africa, their governments, and their institutions of civil society. The
central matter for careful investigation is the question of the conditions
which inspire certain global causes and consequences with resultant impacts
on security, well-being, and dignity. The conditions to which we refer may be
integrated intellectually and scientifically in a broader paradigm which more
effectively describe the actual conditions of global power as a starting point
for understanding globalism's essential problems: what actual causes and
conditions generate the problems and how the threats and potentials of
globalism may receive normative and wise direction for securing the common
[Vol. 17:413
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interests of rich and poor on a global basis. We now focus on what globalism
means for Africa and the have-nots of the Earth.
C. The Outcomes of Globalism: However Defined
If we use Africa as a normative yard-stick for an appraisal of what
globalism means for the human community, we can list several major and
important outcomes that threaten human wellbeing and survival as well as
challenges and opportunities for the future. Scholars must grasp the central
problems generated by globalism that affect the most fundamental values of
social organization. This means that we cannot rely on the lazy, received
assumption that a whole set of rules exists, which governs the complex
interactions and relationships of the dynamics of activity structured and
generated by globalism. Scholars now must become more creative in
constructing the rules of global law in a way that clearly responds to the
problems that require interventions appropriate to legal culture.
This does not mean that the rich legal inheritance of the past is obsolete.
On the contrary, it means that teachers creatively must develop the rich
inheritance of the past. Students must grapple with a legal reality in which
the state does not have a clear monopoly on the process of law making.
Additionally, teachers must develop teaching materials and must generate
academic scholarship that will facilitate the professional understanding of
the complex trajectories and players involved in the global law making, law
applying, and law enforcement processes. Finally, professors must act as juris
consults and play important roles as advisors in public and private sector
activities. They may well be in the business of initiating and developing
better methods for managing and understanding the legal structures in
which the unruly transnational world seeks to control and regulate activity
that cuts across group, state, and national lines.
Therefore, a brief glance at any curriculum in any law school in South
Africa, reveals one obvious fact. Every legal subject contains a pure local
component, which is reflected in the way law is taught. 14 However, every legal
subject also might have a multi-state or trans-state dimension to it. Thus,
effective teaching requires that education be given with a view to the trans-
state or multi-group reach of legal problems.
The outcomes of the process of globalism are an appropriate beginning
point from which to re-examine many components of legal pedagogy, the
structure of the curriculum, and the redefinition of appropriate standards of
professionalism. The following is a brief checklist of problems that are
notoriously obvious in the current state of world order:
14 See Winston P. Nagan & Danie Visser, The Global Challenge to Legal Education: Training
Lawyers for a New Paradigm of Economic, Politial and Legal-Cultural Expectations in the 21st
Century, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 9 (2004).
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1. Global economic apartheid; 15
2. The human right to development or development as a gift of the
planet's economically dominant actors;
16
3. Global economic institutions and their preference for vindicating the
interests of the powerful over the interest of the powerless: free trade versus
fair trade;17
4. Protection of the environment, global warming, and the undermining of
global understandings regarding the balance between sustainable
development and the destruction of the environment; 18
5. Human population growth and the capacity of the earth to maintain
human populations within the eco-social and economic capacity of the earth;
6. The global heath crisis (AIDS, malaria, bird flu, resurgence of TB,
etc.);19
7. Global capacity to respond to natural catastrophes (tsunamis,
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.);2°
8. The crisis regarding the respect for human rights and humanitarian
values; 21
15 See Winston P. Nagan, An Appraisal of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 5 J.L.
& REL. 327 (1987).
16 See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, at 186, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
17 See RAVI BATRA, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE: THE POORING OF AMERICA (1996).
18 See U.N. Conference on the Human Env't, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14 and Corr. 1 (June 16, 1972);
World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, at 17, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992);
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2, in
Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/esalsustdev/documentsWSSD-POI-PD/EnglishPOI-
PD.htm.
19 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2006, WORKING TOGETHER FOR
HEALTH (2006), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2006/whrO6_en.pd, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2005: MAKE EVERY MOTHER AND CHILD COUNT (2005),
available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Making-Pregnancy-Safer WHR2005.pdf;
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2004: CHANGING HISTORY (2004),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/whr/2004/924156265x.pdf, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003: SHAPING THE FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.who.int/whr/
2003/en/index.html.
20 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CATASTROPHE RESPONSE & THE AMERICAN RED CROSS IN
GREATER NEW YORK, HOW PREPARED ARE WE, NEW YORK? (2006), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/pubs/NYU-RedCrossPreparednessReport.pdf.
21 See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan, African Human Rights Process: A Contextual Policy Oriented
Approach, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 63 (1992); Winston P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratifieation: The
Potential for United States Adoption and Enforcement of the Convention Against Torture, The
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9. The crisis of the global war system;22
10. The acceleration of the global arms market at all levels;
11. The proliferation and ostensible deregulation of nuclear arsenals as
well as biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction; 23 and
12. The growth of civil society deviance which threatens the world order
in the form of apocalyptic terrorism, state terrorism, organized crime,
trafficking in human beings, drugs, small arms, and possibly criminal trading
in the components of weapons of mass destruction. 24
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE U.N. CHARTER
A. Overview of the Charter System
The global community or society generates important outcomes in the
form of the problems listed above. It also generates structures of authority
and control that facilitate appropriate community responses to these
problems at different levels. In the international community, it is widely
accepted that we have an international constitution: The U.N. Charter. The
Charter emerged as an outcome of the social process of conflict and war. It is
hard to imagine that we would have had the U.N. Charter and its
commitment to human rights, peace and security if the Second World War
had not happened.
There was no doubt a consensus among the victorious powers after the
war that the issue of global peace and security required stronger central
authority and guidance. Similarly, the causes of war and suffering were
identified in large measure as a function of government commitment to the
destruction of human rights and human dignity. As the charter system points
out, if peoples' rights are respected, recourse to violence will correspondingly
be diminished. The challenge today is to consider the adequacy of the
constitutional development of the international community that has been
around since 1945. What is clear is that the conditions, which defined the
critical structures of world society in 1945, are vastly different to the social
forces and structures, which drive the world community today.
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 311 (1990); Winston P. Nagan, International Intellectual Property, Access to
Health Care, and Human Rights: South Africa v. United States, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 155 (2002);
Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law
and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127 (1995).
22 See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375 (2004); Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer,
Patriotism, Nationalism and the War on Terror. A Mild Plea in Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REv. 933
(2004).
23 See Winston Nagan, Nuclear Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge of the
Millennium, 24 YALE L.J. 485 (1999).
24 See Winston P. Nagan & Alvaro de Medeiros, Old Poison in New Bottles: Trafficking and the
Extinction ofRespect, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255 (2006).
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All institutions of governance at the international, regional, and state
levels-and even within state levels-either effectively have to respond to
issues that affect their vital interest or find that law simply functions in a
vacuum as conditions change and transcend the law. A community without
law generally lends itself to situations in which the weakest will be exploited
by the strongest. This, in turn, leads to powerful international forces, such as
multi-national corporations, worldwide conglomerates, or the powerful
organized crime cartels, stating demands that seek to limit the power of law
to regulate their conduct in the global context. With weak central guidance
mechanisms, organized crime flourishes and the rational management
culture of the great corporate actors is not capable of self-regulation.
Corporations often are complicit in conduct that depreciates the human
prospect.
The U.N. system has generated a massive new framework of entities with
transnational legal personality. The U.N. framework and its functional
instruments represent a significant paradigm shift in the framework of not
only international law, but modern jurisprudence and legal theory as well.
This framework requires a description and justification of law that is more
complex and challenging. The U.N. system has influenced three aspects of
regional regimes: economic integration, security, and the protection of human
rights. Thus, international law, however defined, must account for non-
international legal persons such as the United Nations, the European Union,
the African Union, the Organization of American States, and others.
The imprint of U.N. values and institutions not only has influenced the
values of regional and continental law, but it also has influenced the
development of modern forms of constitutional law within states. South
Africa is an important illustration. In particular, the recognition of the
individual as a subject of the international legal system, gives us an insight
into the way in which the constitution of the United Nations itself has served
as a structural juridical basis for the development of the forces of globalism
and its discontents. At the beginning of this millennium, there was a
consensus in the international community that the quality of economic,
social, and legal justice should be improved on a global basis. The next
section outlines the framework of these goals for the new millennium.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE
EMPOWERMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The preamble to the U.N. Charter provides a marker of global legitimacy.
That marker is symbolized by the phrase "we the peoples. '25 In short, the
Charter roots its authority in "the peoples" and does so pointedly, without
reference to the sovereign state. Yet, the Charter creates an architecture that
makes formal membership in the United Nations a function of the
25 U.N. Charter pmbl., available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
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international recognition of statehood.26 The hard law of the U.N. Charter
favors the legal primacy of the state. Although individuals, corporations,
international non-governmental organizations (INGO), and larger civil
society organizations are the essential components of the global community,
as a technical matter, the state constitutionally holds a preferred position in
international law. However, the salience of the neo-liberal foundations of the
global economy is based upon a model of doing global business with limited
state or public regulation. Business is a critical part of global civil society.
This section touches on the development of other sectors of civil society,
including the important role of private military contractors in the promotion
of global security and possibly insecurity. To set the scene for this analysis,
the constitutional architecture of the Charter system and its state-centered
dimensions are analyzed. This article also demonstrates how the growth of
human rights and INGO activity indirectly, but significantly, has broadened
the level of participation in the U.N. Charter system giving globalism its
community texture.
The state historically has been the only player that officially engages in
war. That function of the state was moderated by the creation of institutions
of collective security in the United Nations Those institutions, however,
functioned on state consent as well as the consent of the permanent members
of the Security Council. In general, the international system lawfully permits
a state to use force in self-defense or the state to act collectively through the
United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. This
system supports the critical monopoly of the state's use of force in
international law.
However, the above model seems to be undergoing a radical
transformation. In order to give an accurate appraisal of that transformation,
it would be useful to review the legal evolution of the role of state and non-
state actors as well as civil society in the context of the U.N. Charter.
A. The Nature of International Law, Globalism, and Emerging Civil Society
The Union of International Associations urges that we are in the midst of
a global revolution relating to the context, structure, and process of civil
society. The organization holds, for example, that there are incipient trends
toward global democratization and the visualization of an alternative
organization design. The organization does not tell us exactly what that
alternative design is.
However, there exist large and complex organizations in the international
system, which are impacted deeply by the communications revolution.
Critical indices are being developed to determine the extent of cohesion and
bonding, as well as the level of formalization and coherence, of civil society
associations.
26 Id. at art. 3.
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There are many large, complex organizations, whether intergovernmental
or multinational, or their national equivalents. Many non-profit
organizations are increasingly complex. Such complexity takes the form of
numerous specialized units. The challenge is to ensure that these units work
together in a coherent, meaningful manner. Increasingly, the
communications of such organizations are based electronically so the critical
question is how the communications between the parts of civil society are
organized.
In order to facilitate discussion among these complex organizations it
may be useful to explore the notions of interlocking round tables as the basis
for the emergence of new forms of non-hierarchical organization that may be
vital to sustainable community. It might prove to be the case that the
sustainability of a community results from appropriate global configuration-
interlocking the diversity of community dialogue arenas.
When we place these insights in the context of emergent globalism, the
role of civil society requires us to understand more adequately the conditions
shaping the future of world order and world politics. How are we to
understand the "forces" of globalism and the role of civil society associations
within it? The theorist, James Rosenau, argues that "the best way to grasp
world affairs today is to view them as an endless series of tensions in which
the forces pressing for greater globalization and those pressing for greater
localization interactively play themselves out."27 These forces, Rosenau
argues, are influenced by the skill and communication revolution, the
''organizational explosion," which witnesses a "staggering number of new
organizations," some tightly organized with clear lines of interest and
authority, and others that are "loosely structured. ' '28 These processes suggest
states are getting stronger in some respects and weaker in others; there is a
reassertion of the archaic idea of "sovereignty,"29 while it is being eroded by
the facts of economic, military, and cultural inter-dependence. Today, the
structural foundations of international constitutional order are in flux. At the
theoretical level, we are witnessing a profound change in the structure and
process of international constitutional order, in which there is considerable
rearrangement of the vectors of control and authority in international society.
B. Apartheid. Corporate Civil Society Versus Humanitarian Civil Society
The anti-apartheid movement generated two opposed versions of civil
society. Thus the private sector created the great controversies about the
relationship of human rights to political economy. These lines were drawn
sharply during the period of apartheid in South Africa. Apartheid was
condemned universally as an affront to the U.N. Charter, creating a dilemma
27 JAMES N. ROSENAU, DISTANT PROXIMITIES: DYNAMIcS BEYOND GLOBALIZATION (2003).
28 Id.
29 See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 142 (2004).
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for the international community. On the other hand, the apartheid system
provided stability, racial exploitation, and economic opportunities resulting
in seemingly attractive economic returns. Critics of corporate involvement in
South Africa argued that the corporate stake in the country served to support
the regime. In short, the corporations benefited substantially from their
economic investments in South Africa. There was significant resistance to the
imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa. Finally, when the U.S.
Congress enacted the comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the threat
of sanctions significantly influenced the process of South Africa's
transformation to democracy. The troubling aspect of the apartheid problem,
in particular corporate involvement in sustaining it, was whether corporate
action, more partial to international law, might have expedited the
transformation and the costs of the change. In short, corporate involvement
in the political economy of South Africa's apartheid placed enormous
pressures on the international system in terms of regional security and
human rights deprivations.
C. Constitutional Limits and Allocations of Power in the Global Community
There is a striking constitutional analogy in the documentary basis of the
international constitutional system and the constitutional architecture of the
modern sovereign state. The fundamental reality behind all forms of
constitutionalism is that the constitution manages basic expectations and
understandings about the allocation of fundamental decision-making
competences in the relevant political universe. The U.N. Charter, therefore,
has a formal structure that is analogous to the general way in which states
constitutionally are managed. A constitution organizes and manages
expectations about the distribution of power in a nation-state. The allocation
of power via a Bill of Rights-whether state, regional, or international-gives
modern constitutionalism the distinctive character of specifically including
the rights and powers of individuals in the political and judicial processes.
The main lines of the division of power are usually some version of the
separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The recognition of
individual rights, as rights that must be seriously maintained, reflects the
modification of the sovereignty idea in a way that provides protections and
significant empowerments for individuals. This form of allocating power is
characteristic of the U.S. Constitution and many others modeled on it. In this
constitutional model, the state must enforce individual rights when
individuals claim them. Thus, the model of protecting fundamental human
rights creates an individual right and creates a state obligation to prescribe,
apply, and enforce these rights. As indicated earlier, the model of state
sovereignty from an international perspective contained important elements
of state absolutism. Thus, individuals could not rely on the state to give
practical effect to fundamental rights even if these rights were part of the
constitutional system and even if the actual exercise of state power
compromises the formal guidance of constitutional prescription.
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The paradigm of human rights in the post-war period is a critical
component of the concept "we the people," which is not defined in the
Charter. We may reasonably assume that the reference to human rights and
the concept of "we the people" is also a reference to the civil society concept.
In constitutional terms, the civil society is the allocation of competence to the
sphere of human relationships where the state's role is attenuated and where
it only has limited power to coerce. Thus, a constitution that recognizes the
sphere of civil society also recognizes individual rights against the state.
There are certain structural similarities between the international
constitutional process and that of a developed rule of law state. There is an
International Bill of Rights and there is an international obligation to limit
the state's power. Developed state constitutions have bills-of-rights- or
human-rights-inspired prescriptions that also limit the state's coercive power.
These general structural similarities cannot be pushed too far. Domestic
systems tend to have power relationships that are largely vertical. The
international system is somewhat vertical, but still largely is a horizontal
system in which the rules of reciprocity and retaliation often serve as positive
or negative sanctions.
One of the most important and often unobserved principles of
constitutionalism at any level is that constitutional process-like all forms of
institutional arrangements-it is not static. In constitutional law, the
relationship of power to law is sharp and potent: constitutions allocate power.
Claims for power invariably are claims for change in the management of
power. This element of social realism may be observed nationally and
internationally. If constitutions were simply unchanging doctrines, there only
would be the illusion of a working constitutional order. Thus, the proximity of
constitutionalism to change, nationally and internationally, means that this
is one of the most dynamic branches of law and practice. Because the stakes
of allocating power are high, the contestations about constitutional rules and
principles are corresponding matters that include important legal and
political stakes.
VI. IDEOLOGICAL ECONOMIC CONTESTATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
The unfinished and contested structure of normative priority for
international economic order and social justice reflects the clash of two
important but critical, ideological perspectives associated with the original
North/South divide. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources articulated a link between state
sovereignty and the sovereign's right and obligation to vest a stronger form of
property entitlement in the state itself.30 The resolution formulated the
30 Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
Doc. A/5207 (Dec. 14, 1962), available at http://www.unhchr.chthtml/menu3fb/cnatres.htm (last
visited on May 31, 2007) [hereinafter Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty].
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principle of a state's right to permanent sovereignty over its natural
resources. The Resolution touched on critical, practical, and ideological
interests. For example, justifying the state's power to control and expropriate
property, the Resolutions targeted the economic legacy of colonialism.
Colonial conquest involved the expropriation of indigenous resources.
Land was an important resource in colonial conquest and dominance. In
traditional African community systems, land defines the identity of
indigenous communities. It is the basis of the group itself. The expropriation
of land from traditional indigenous people would therefore undermine the
foundation of the group and its pattern of social and political solidarity. This
matter arose in southern Africa in the case of In re Southern Rhodesia, a
decision of the Privy Council of the House of Lords.31 The sequence of
historical events that led to the lawsuit illustrates the problem of the
acquisition of land by concessionary agreement under color of colonial law
and its ultimate conquest by private sector force. Cecil John Rhodes sent
agents of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to negotiate with the
King of the Ndebele for mining rights. The Company was a chartered
company under the British Empire. The BSAC assumed that the kingdom
was in fact sitting on a treasure trove of valuable natural resources such as
diamonds. The famous, or infamous, Rudd concession thus emerged. The
concession gave the British South Africa company the right to mine on the
Ndebele land. In return for this right, the British Empire gave the indigenous
people benefits under the concession. The British used the Rudd concession
as a political instrument to justify the conquest of the African state by a
private, commercial, and for-profit corporation. In short, the Rhodesian
private army used the Rudd concession to conquer Southern Rhodesia.
Having conquered Southern Rhodesia, the British South Africa Company
claimed all of the land as its private property. The black people took the case
to the Privy Council in 1914. Because of the war, the case was not heard until
1919. The Privy Council ruled that the company had no property right to
ownership of the entire state by conquest. The company, in conducting the
war of conquest, acted on behalf of the Crown of England. Therefore, the
company could not exercise sovereign power as an incident of conquest.
However, the court also ruled that the black people had no recognizable legal
interest in the land that could be adjudicated in Western courts. In short,
they had no right to property. The land belonged to the colonial state, and
that state therefore could allocate the land as it saw fit. The colonizers
benefited greatly from their control over the colonial politics.
The history of Southern Rhodesia illustrates the process of material
dispossession within the framework of colonial rule. In Latin America, the
rights of the indigenous people similarly are illustrative. There, colonizers did
not recognize the indigenous people's legal interest in their land. Modern
economists see these kinds of colonial/feudal style processes as one of the key
31 See In re Southern Rhodesia 1919 App. Cas. 211 (P.C. 1918) (S. Mr.).
Spring 2008]
TRANSNA TIONAL LA w & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 17:413
conditions of endemic poverty and human rights deprivation.
The Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty was a significant effort to
change the economic expectations of the colonial era. 32 It also was a critical
step in dissolving colonial claims and transitioning the indigenous people
towards independence. Most importantly, the Resolution weakened the
protection of the right to property in the international environment, as well
as colonialists' in light of traditional market-driven concepts of state
appropriation of property.
Meanwhile, the supporters of the new international economic order
forged ahead with an important U.N. initiative: the Charter on the Economic
Rights and Duties of States.33 The Charter subsequently was followed by the
Declaration on the Right to Development. 34 These instruments forged two
principle expectations about the conflicts in international economic order.
The Charter and the Declaration vested a great deal of development power in
newly freed states. The economic model, apparently incorporated into this
state-central ideology, implied a form of creeping socialism.
The principle behind the Declaration on the Right to Development
included the idea of sharing economic and technical resources to benefit the
new states.35 The United Nations promoted the principle of sharing as a
mandatory, rather than a discretionary, obligation to sustain global equity. It
is clear that this evolving international law was confronting two radically
contentious ideological perspectives. The first would center on the promise of
protecting property in the international environment. The protection of
property would be a marker of a state's commitment to a paradigm
sympathetic to the global private sector rather than the national or global
public sector. The second perspective is associated with the perspectives of
international socialists or social democratic ideology. It recognized that the
public should control all economic development or that the public shares in
the management of the production and distribution of wealth and related
values.
The contemporary state of the global economy witnessed the ascent of the
privatization of national and global economic institutions. It also witnessed
emerging market economies, free trade zones, and the dominant role of
corporate enterprise. The mantra of the free trade market phenomena has
been "world peace through world trade."36 The ascent of the private sector is
32 See Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 30.
33 See Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 29/3281, U.N. Doc.
AJRES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1979).
31 See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, at 1, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 101, 97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/496/36/IMG/NRO49636.pdf?OpenElement
(last visited May 31, 2007).
35 Id. at art. 3(3).
36 Lawyer Roles, supra note 2, at 134.
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considered to be more efficient and less wasteful than corrupt and inefficient
state bureaucracies.
The global institutionalization reflected these developments (the legal
and political cultures of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank). To some
degree, they came at the expense of working through the development
agencies of the United Nations. However, a significant policy shift had
emerged in the global economy. The emergence of a coalition of economically
dominant states, the Group of Eight, reflected this policy shift. From a
technical point of view, the international economic soft law associated with
the new international economic order has become even softer. On the other
hand, it is unclear what the general emerging rules are that govern the neo-
liberal economy. The institutions of this perspective have been under
pressure in part because the lex specialis within these institutions is
sometimes incompatible with general international law and international
human rights law. Moreover, critical appraisal of many of the operational
rules often shows that the rules are enforced strictly against the powerless
and often ignored by the powerful. Moreover, the efficiency of the model is
under critical examination because the outcomes seem to generate greater
global disparity and greater global alienation, and some would even suggest,
the radical division between rich and poor may be a cause of radical religious
activism or possibly even apocalyptic terrorism.
Catastrophic natural events such as the tsunami in Southeast Asia,
Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and the recent earthquake in
Pakistan raise the question of whether the global collective responses to
these natural tragedies are a matter of beneficence and altruism or whether
the responses themselves simply generate tacit but important expectations of
international soft law obligation. In Africa, the high intensity violent conflicts
in many parts of the continent-especially in the Sudan, the horn of Africa,
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo-also raise concerns
about the protection of global peace and security as either a matter of
discretionary altruism or legal obligation.
It may be that constructing a stronger moral foundation for global
solidarity in the context of natural or man-made catastrophic crises requires
that the first step in moral or value justification to be an appeal to the self-
interest of the powerful sectors of global society. A compelling argument may
be made that the self-interest of the "haves" in security, economic prosperity,
and the health of their populations are better protected when those interests
are recognized as of critical importance. When that interest is complemented
by the idea of global solidarity and the element of altruism, we may have a
The world peace through world trade movements, spearheaded by the
Trilateral Commission, envisaged a global world order under the direction of
the captains of corporate monopoly efficiency, a vision which comprises a
diffuse human rights agenda focusing on the role of NGO's and an enhanced
role for the corporate side of civil society.
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stronger basis for the design of progressive policies that ensure a
commitment to the deprived parts of humanity. In short, helping the poor
actually helps the rich as well.
A good deal of modern economic theory seeks to insulate the market from
non-market factors. Altruism may be valued only to the extent that it has
market value. In short, altruism standing alone as a moral principle may
actually be seen as a marker indicating weakness within the functions of
market conditions and corporate culture. The business culture thrives on self-
interest. This is a reality. Theory might improve the structure and process of
both business and the larger social universe if the meaning of self-interest is
defined more broadly to capture the real world of human and economic
relations and supplemented by an altruistic gloss to provide a strong
justification for broadening the focus and concern of the culture of enterprise.
How does the above discussion impact economic policies relevant to
Africa?
Although important strides have been made to improve national and
continental governance, to promote more effective, on the ground, economic
initiatives, and to promote the rights of women in all sectors, including the
economy, the global debate remains clouded and depressing. It is clear that
there is a critical agenda of great intellectual and professional importance to
be developed and understood. Developing this agenda in the training of
tomorrow's leaders will be a small but important step for African progress.
The challenge for law professors now is to take a hard look at all the
models that have emerged and to consider the critical components of broader
self-interest, elements of altruism, and a commitment to development on a
universal basis as an important foundation for ultimately promoting peace,
security, and dignity. Africa's lawyers and law professors will have to play
important roles in unraveling the mysteries of globalism and defining and
defending Africa's interests with competence, skill, and strategic insight.
VII. THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION AND THE REFORM OF
THE UNITED NATIONS
The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of
those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too
littleY
The privatization animus of globalism in the international economic order
was one of the factors which generated strong support for a more equitable
economic world order. As the millennium approached, a global consensus
emerged for the United Nations to spearhead a humanitarian initiative to
capitalize on a symbolic moment, which could be given a constructive gloss.
The result was the Millennium Declaration (Declaration) that touched on
some of the most important questions of elementary economic justice for the
37 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937).
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deprived segment of humanity. 38 The Declaration was of critical importance
to Africa because it represented the articulation of specific objectives with the
expectation that these goal would be given a concrete measure of support and
a realistic timeline to succeed. The goals represented issues about which
there could be no quibbling as to their moral salience, political importance,
or, economic feasibility. 39 The importance of the Declaration was its ability to
crystallize the central issues of a global justice in a clear and effective
manner. This mood is best expressed by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan:
We will have time to reach the [Millennium Development]
Goals-worldwide and in most, or even all, individual
countries-but only if we break with business as usual.
We cannot win overnight. Success will require sustained
action across the entire decade between now and the deadline.
It takes time to train the teachers, nurses and engineers; to
build the roads, schools and hospitals; to grow the small and
large businesses able to create the jobs and income needed.
So, we must start now.
And, we must more than double global development
assistance over the next few years. Nothing less will help to
achieve the Goals. 40
The specific millennium goals in the Declaration were:
Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education
Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases
Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development 41
The millennium goals also were tied to a U.N. reform. U.N. reform
generated a complex and difficult debate about what the necessary changes
must be. Specifically, any change ultimately would have to be a constitutional
change. This meant amending the U.N. Charter. The critical challenge in a
world that is vastly uneven in the distribution of power, wealth, respect, and
38 United Nations Millenium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000).
39 See id.
40 Press Release, Secretary General, Millenium Development Goals Have Unprecedented
Political Support, Secretary-General Says at London Event, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9984 DEV/2527
(June 7, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9984.doc.htm.
41 See United Nations Millenium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8,
2000).
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prestige remains one of the most challenging political issues in the global
agenda. The report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, stressed
getting back to the fundamental values which fueled the creation of The
Charter: freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of conscience and
belief, and freedom of assembly.
Two critical issues were the issues of freedom from want (which had a
direct tie-in to the Millennium Declaration) and freedom from fear (the fear of
global security and conflict management). The problem with these initiatives
was that one of the most important powers in the world community, the
United States, had experienced a change of government. The new
government, led by George W. Bush, was highly skeptical of international
law. Indeed, the former ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton,
maintained early on that the United States should be exempt from
international law.42 A similar perspective was indicated by the current
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. In order to undermine both the
millennium goals and the reform of the U.N. agenda, the Bush
administration presented at the last minute, a list of at least 750 changes.
43
This could not have been considered seriously at the diplomatic level and it
became clear that the purpose of this vast body of amendments simply was to
make the U.N. reform process an illusion. In fact, Ambassador Bolton stated
early on that, "There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only
the international community, which can only be led by the only remaining
superpower, which is the United States."
44
A. The United Nations and Global Apartheid
This Article focuses on two of globalism's principle outcomes. These are
the problems of the political economy of globalism and the issue of so-called
Global Apartheid. This first issue touches on the most widely used
justification of globalism, namely the flow of goods, services, capital and
42 See Nomination of John R. Bolton: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th
Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of John R. Bolton, U.N. Ambassador of the United States).
It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when
it may seem in our short-term interest to do so, because over the long term,
the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are
those who want to constrict the United States.
Id. See also, Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False
Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2000, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
20001101 facomment932/peter-j-spiro/the-new-sovereigntists-american-exceptionalism-and-its-
false-prophets.html.
43 See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT' L 351, 375 (2004); Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer,
Patriotism, Nationalism and the War on Terror: A Mild Plea in Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REV. 933,
948 (2004).
44 Roland Watson, Bush Deploys Hawk as New UN Envoy, TIMES ONLINE (London), Mar. 8,
2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uklartile/0,,110691515816,00.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2006).
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finance, as well as labor. The political economy of globalism has reached
extraordinary levels, sustained partly by the immense technological changes
in all phases of human communications. In short, there is a global economy,
with global priorities, stressing global economic inter-dependence. This
economy has generated untold wealth exceeding anything in the past. This
economy also has generated a radical cleavage between the states and
communities that monopolize much of the wealth and resources of the global
economy as against an overwhelming population of deprived people whose
position seems to worsen ceaselessly.4 5
The Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, titled "In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,"
gives importance to the freedom from want, freedom from fear, the right to
live in dignity, and to the ways in which the institutional architecture of the
United Nations might be improved to respond to the central problems of our
time.46 The Secretary General notes that one of the most important issues for
the international community is the issue of global poverty. Global poverty
contributes to pandemic diseases and compromises global health security.
Poverty also breeds alienation, and this in turn fuels violent conflict and the
desperation of terrorism. Thus, new forms of terrorism sometimes are
conceptualized as apocalyptic forms of terrorism. The Secretary General
notes the continued ubiquity of the low and high intensity of conflict and the
natural catastrophes that displace millions of people. The report also states
that more than one billion people live below the poverty line and subsist on
approximately one U.S. dollar per day. Twenty thousand people die as a
direct result of poverty each day. 47 Therefore, it is critical that the world
community works toward the millennium development goals.
The problem with the millennium goals is that they challenge some of the
most fundamental ideological issues concerning the roles of the state and the
international community, who act mainly through the United Nations to
deliver a core minimum of defensible values incorporating economic and
social justice rights. When U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt inserted
"freedom from want" into the Atlantic Charter, 48 it reflected his belief, drawn
from the American experience, that civil and political rights are diminished if
basic economic rights and social entitlements are absent.49 The New Deal
45 See Winston P. Nagan, Law and Post-Apartheid South Africa, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 399,
399-451 (1989).
46 See SECRETARY GENERAL, IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL, FOR DECISION BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT (Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf.
47 Id.
48 See The Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/
infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm.
49 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, VOLUME 2: THE YEAR OF CRISIS 11, 11-16
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
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captured this idea in an appealing, yet graphic metaphor: "A chicken in every
pot." It therefore was quite natural for Roosevelt to insert into the war aims
of the allies this component as a social justice entitlement for the post-war
community.5 0 When the instruments based on the universal declaration were
adopted, the most controversial one, in an economic context, was the
International Covenant on Social, Cultural, and Economic Rights.
5
' It was
vigorously contested whether such rights could be rights at all,
52 or merely
goals.53 Thus there was no binding obligation on states to vindicate them as
an international mandate for it citizens. 54 This issue remains highly charged
and contested. South African jurisprudence has made an important
contribution in determining the extent to which socio-economic constitutional
rights fall within the competence of constitutional adjudication.55 However, it
is imperative to locate the Millennium Declaration in its appropriate historic
and ideological context.
At the height of the decolonization process, a number of U.N.-inspired
instruments were promulgated, which sought to give a stronger imprimatur
of legal authority to the issue of global economic justice.5 6 Those instruments
were in part influenced by the fact that colonial rule in most of the colonized
world had been in some degree economically exploitive of the nations under
colonial dominance. Thus, the important resolution concerning permanent
sovereignty over natural resources was an effort to regress the appropriation
of the resources of colonized nations in the interest of the colonial rulers.
5 7
The Resolution proved to be incredibly controversial because it suggested
that there was an implicit equity, which could support a new state in its need
or desire to appropriate property of the colonial rulers on the basis of such
property. If the property is characterized as an intrinsic part of the state's
natural resources, it could be nationalized or otherwise defined by the new
post-colonial elite. 58 This resolution, in effect, touched on a central issue
50 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, The "Four Freedoms" Speech, Annual Message to
Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html.
51 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 4 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), available athttp://www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu3/b/a-cescr.htm.
52 See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 96th
Cong., 106 (1979) (statement of Phyllis Schlafly, lawyer, activist, and journalist).
53 E.V.O. Dankwa & C. Flinterman, The Significance of the Limburg Principles, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 275, 277 (Paul DeWaart, Paul Peters & Erik Denters
eds., 1988).
54 Id.
15 See Danie Brand, Introduction to Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution, 2
L. DEMOCRACY & DEV. 153 (1998).
56 See U.N. Decolonization Instruments, available at http://www.un.org/issues/docs/d-decol.html.
57 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15, 17 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3b/
cnatres.htm
5 Id.
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relating to the security of foreign investments. Thus, the Resolution could be
used in a just and equitable way and still lead to consequences that are far-
reaching in the financial markets of the larger world community. If a state
expropriated, even if it had justifiable grounds for doing so, it would be seen
as a state hostile to foreign investment. Additionally, the standards for
taking the property met an ostensible public purpose but weakened the
standard of compensation as well as the time frame for it.59
The above approach clearly challenged the traditional way in which
international law protected foreign investment. The primary problem was
that international rules protecting foreign investment worked on
assumptions that did not take into account the special circumstances of the
exploitative character of colonial rule. This became an important ideological
objective for the newly independent de-colonized states. The process evolved
into what was called a new international economic order. This was in turn
sustained by the important view in declaration on the economic rights and
duties of states and the declaration on the right to development. The de-
colonized world and its allies, generally called "the South," now confronted
the former colonial powers and their allies, generally called "the North."60
There were many arenas where such ideological conflicts were contested
among the more prominent conflicts and negotiations relating to the
Convention on the Law of the Sea.61 It regularly has been seen that the
resources, such as the Manganese Nodules on the deep-sea ocean floor, have
been accessible mainly to states that monopolize the technology of deep-sea
ocean mining.62 Thus, the Law of the Sea could mandate a free enterprise
approach to the common resources-the heritage of all of humankind--or it
could create a common enterprise of sharing, which would be similar to the
goals of global social democratic dispensation.
The global forces antagonistic to the principles of New International
Economic Order and its assertion of a fundamental right to development
began to evolve in ways that sought to weaken the economic role of the
United Nations in matters of global economic policy. One strategy essentially
was to decouple international economic order from general international law
and politics. 6 3
As these conflicts evolved in the international community, it became
apparent that the U.N. Charter system, general international law, and
international economic order were becoming disengaged matters. A
diminished U.N. influence meant that general international law and
59 Id.
60 See GARRETT NAGLE, DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1998).
61 See POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 175 (Lawrence S. Finkelstein ed., 1988).
62 See YUWEN LI, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FOR DEEP SEA-BED MINING 1-2 (1994).
63 See JERZY MAKARCZYK, PRINCIPLES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 166-67
(1988).
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international economic order began to travel in parallel, but always
complementary, trajectories. Politics and economics are specialized matters,
and their scientific and intellectual universes are both distinct and discrete.
The major objectives of the U.N. Charter's include matters of international
peace and security.64 However, the U.N. Charter also suggests that peace and
security are important bases for the achievement of other global world
priorities, such as respect for the rule of law, human rights, global economic
equity, development, and progress. 65 If the mandate of general international
law was unclear about the inter-dependence of peace, political economy, and
human rights, the key institutions of Western economic order sought to
insulate players such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank from being contaminated both by world politics and general
international law. 66 In contrast, as indicated, newly emancipated states were
strident in defending their permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources and sought to integrate a new economic global agenda.6 7 The North-
South discourse and the New International Economic Order were meant to be
the centerpieces of a new world order framework.
B. The Group of Eight and Its Impact on the New International Order
The most visible expression of the triumph of the counterrevolution
against the New International Economic Order perspective and its
commitment to human rights development has been the emergence of a
coalition of economically dominant or influential powers known as the Group
of Eight or G8. The G8 currently seems to function as a type of de facto
"international economic security council."68 It clearly has a legal architecture
and an immense influence on the international community. However, its
inner workings and the living law of the G8 process of norm-setting remains
somewhat non-transparent; 69 and poorly-understood, yet critical global
policies that affect the lives and well being of billions of people may emerge
from the G8's decision-making process. In the aftermath of the
transformation of South Africa, President Nelson Mandela attended a G8
meeting.70 It was his hope and expectation that the promises to give South
64 See U.N. Charter art. 2, pmbl., available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited
Apr. 4, 2008).
65 Id. The same Preamble states: "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." Id.
66 NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THEIR BORROWERS 182
(2006).
67 Nagan & Hammer, supra note 29, at 180.
68 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 83 (Michele Fratianni et al. eds., 2005).
69 See THE NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (Nicholas Bayne, Stephen Woolcock & Colin Budd eds., 2003).
70 Africa to Miss Key Poverty Goals, BBC NEWS, Jan. 17, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
I/hi/world/africa/4180595.stm.
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Africa the kind of financial assistance necessary for its transformations to a
democracy would be honored. As he graphically suggested, the leaders of the
G8 came to the meeting with all the pens and papers, but the pens had no
ink. According to Mandela:
As long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality persist in
our world, none of us can truly rest. . . . The steps that are
needed from the developed nations are clear. The first is
ensuring trade justice .... The second is an end to the debt
crisis for the poorest countries. The third is to deliver much
more aid and make sure it is of the highest quality .... But
not to do this would be a crime against humanity, against
which I ask all humanity now to rise up.7 1
This experience indicated disillusionment about the predictability and
reliability of G8 undertakings. It is important to note that the G8 itself works
on a model of so-called "neo-liberal" economic and political perspectives that
are reflected in the forces of globalism, the concept of emerging markets, and
an implicit political culture which seeks to separate law and politics from
economics.7 2 The fact that the problems of economic equity are still matters of
critical global concern suggests that the focus of attention of many states is
on the G8 itself. This is a new field of conflict. The new battleground is the
requirement that globalism and its "neo-liberal" animating principles have a
human face, a face that has a political and juridical side to it. Prime Minister
Tony Blair has insisted that the G8 take a more expansive approach to the
problem of global poverty-a matter that is tied to the issue of global debt
repayments.7 3 Global poverty, which seems to be an institutional part of the
new global economic order, has been characterized as a form of economic
apartheid.7 4 Whatever perspective one takes on the current state of world
economic order, it would seem that a great deal of the current structure and
process-how this order actually works, what its known generating qualities
are, how it impacts upon matters of war and peace, prosperity, and poverty-
suggest a critical but necessary focus for the future of legal education and
professionalism, at least in Africa.
71 Nelson Mandella, Address to the Campaign to Make Poverty History at London Trafalgar
Square, (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/2005/
nm0702.html. See also In Full: Mandela's Poverty Speech, BBC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2hi/uknews/politics/4232603.stm.
72 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 66 (2005).
73 Aid for Africa: G8 Debt Reliefis a Positive Step, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), July 2, 2005,
at 20A.
74 ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 33 (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 2002).
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C. The Consequences of the Current Global Economic Order75
The shortest way to get a grasp of the consequences of the current state of
global economic order is reflected in numbers. The planet has a population of
roughly 6.5 billion people. 76 Every year 30 million people die of hunger,77 and
800 million people are starving or suffer acute malnutrition.78 Roughly one
billion are underemployed or unemployed. 79 The above figure may be
contrasted with the fact that the richest 2 percent of adults in the world own
more than half of the global household wealth.80 The richest 1 percent of
adults own 40 percent of the global assets, and the richest 10 percent account
for 85 percent of the total world assets.81 On the other hand, the bottom half
of the world adult population owns 1 percent of global assets.8 2 Every two
minutes four people die form malaria.8 3 One in five people (one billion people)
in the world survive on less than $1 a day.8 4 Another 1.5 billion live on $1 to
$2 a day.85 More than one billion people do not have access to safe water.8 6
About 2.6 billion people lack access to improved sanitation.8 7 Some
authorities hold that approximately five hundred million people on the planet
live in relative comfort, which is in stark contrast to the six billion people in
the world who struggle to survive and live. Even in the United States, 44.8
million people are deprived of medical health care or coverage88 and almost
75 John Hooper, Pope's Book Accuses Rich Nations of Robbery, THE GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 5,
2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/globalisation/story/O,,2050253,00.html.
76 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. & World Population Clocks, http://www.census.gov/main/www/
popelock.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
77 See Global Policy World Hunger-Social and Economic Policy, www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/
hunger/hungerindex.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
78 See Conscious Alliance, Educate, www.consciousalliance.org/educate.htm (last visited May 8,
2007).
79 See ILO WORLD EMPLOYMENT REPORT 1998-99, www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/
1998/33.htm.
80 See Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, Growth, http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile-
canadian -initilgrowth/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). See also, Richest 2% Hold Half the
World's Assets, FIN. TIMES, Dec 5, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/41470ec0-845b-ldb-87e0-
0000779e2340.html.
81 James Randerson, World's Richest 1% Own 40% of All Wealth, UN Report Discovers, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 6, 2006, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/
0,,1965149,00.html.
82 Id.
83 See Human Development Report 2005, The State of Human Development, ch. 1,
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05-chapterl .pff.
S4 Id.
85 rd.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 U.S. Census Bureau, Newsroom, Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/releases/archiveslhealth-care-insurance/009789.html.
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forty million Americans live close to or below the poverty line.8 9 In short,
globalism, which has produced a vast increase in the production of values,
seems to fail miserably in the distribution or sharing of those values.
As the new millennium unfolds, statistics indicate that nearly 800 million
people are illiterate. 90 This fact illustrates that people basically are
powerless. They are treated as economic commodities to be exploited by the
powerful or as economic waste matter to be discarded by the market. The
adverse effects that the global market has caused does not just include
illiteracy, but other areas including: demographics, the migration of people,
issues of conflict, trade, aid, debt, debt repayment, etc. However, this new
world order referred to as neo-liberal global economics, is not solely to blame.
For example, the economic arrangements in China, India, Brazil, and other
parts of Asia demonstrate that each of these state-commanded economies are
designated to benefit the elite who are not held accountable by government
constraints for their actions.
Further, neo-economic freedoms may vanish much like they did in the
former Soviet Union, when it transitioned from a communist state to a
capitalist market. These problems include the mass concentration of wealth
in actors well-placed in the former communist regime.9 1 Many of the
dominant communist elite took a lion's share of state-owned enterprises,
essentially claiming it as their own property. 92 In order for economic freedom
to be preserved, public and private laws need to be implemented and adhered
to, in order to prevent a select few from destroying this freedom.
The economic revolutions in India, China, and Brazil were successful
because their populations implemented a strong legal framework that did not
allow any individual to manipulate the market system. The central flaw in
the philosophy of economic liberalization from a lawyer's point of view is the
principle that liberalization of anything if unconstrained will result in a
license for the liberalizer and oppression for the victim. A specific problem
89 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 2005 HIGHLIGHTS, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/poverty/poverty05/pov05hi.html (last visited May 8, 2007).
- See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, CH. 1: THE STATE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT,
a vailable at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/20O5/pdf/HDRO5_chapter-I.pdf.
91 Vladimir Volkov & Julia Denenberg, Wealth & Poverty in Modern Russia, WORLD SOCIALIST,
Mar. 11, 2005, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/russ-mll.shtml.
Twenty percent of the Russian population lives below the poverty line and
the great majority of Russian families are teetering on the edge of poverty.
Then there is the other Russia. Russia is ranked third in the world for the
number of billionaires. The greatest part of shareholdings in the largest
Russian enterprises can be found in the hands of this tiny social layer. There
are more billionaires in Russia (36) than anywhere else in the world. The
total assets of these thirty-six richest Russians amounts to $110 billion-24
percent of the country's economic output.
Id.
92 JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI ET AL., KREMLIN CAPITALISM 33-36 (1996).
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with socialist regimes is that the government can abuse its power of control.
The concentration of power does not necessarily mean that everyone shares
in it; such a belief is typified by the myth: "dictatorship of the proletariat." In
practice, the proletariats likely will be disempowered by the internal elites
who manage the power of the state, according to their own interests.
If we take a social democratic state where the power resides in both
public and private sectors, a high level of disparity arises. Nonetheless, the
power of the various groups, if reasonably well distributed, imposes certain
checks and balances sufficient to sustain a reasonably transparent,
responsible, and accountable system. For example, in a neo-liberal state,
certain groups abhor government interference, except when the government
acts in its interest. In this type of state, corporate culture stakes a claim to
legitimacy on the basis that state officials and state elites simply are
inefficient.
To generate economic efficiency, it is important to allocate as much power
to economic enterprise as possible. Thus, labor unions must be weakened
because they represent a dysfunctional limit on the freedom of enterprise.
Social spending, spending for education, health, and other public purposes
are matters for which the state is an ineffectual distributor. Thus, where
possible, these matters must be privatized in order for these enterprises to be
most efficiently run. In short, the private arena does not need many rules; the
master rule of enterprise is to generate productivity and profit, while
stimulating the interest for invention and for economic expansion. The
public's fear of depreciation in social and political capital by such a process is
seen as a necessary, but short-term, cost for the greater good of society.
The state's imperfections in its exercise of power recreates a need for a
strong legal infrastructure that would help to foster the ideals of
responsibility, transparency, and change. It is not clear what standards
govern decision-making inside major economic enterprises when its business
cannot be on an optimal level. Whether power and authority, transparency
and openness are invested solely in government or not, we will not have
solved the problem of how power itself is controlled, regulated, appraised, and
changed in the interest of the people.
VIII. AFRICAN DEPRIVATION IN GLOBAL CONTEXT
A. The Historic Legacy
I now turn to some of the specific issues concerning Africa. Africa seems
to lead the world today as a zone of hardship. It is appropriate for us to
consider what has toiled Africa and obstructed its ability for human growth.
One of the points made by social critics is that while the centers of economic
activity represented by the Asian Tigers significantly improved their gross
domestic product, Africa during the same period seemed to move in the
opposite direction. Africa is getting poorer. Africans are living shorter lives,
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while experiencing increased hunger and deprivation. 93 The critical
determination is whether South Africa's success can be reciprocated
throughout the rest of the African continent. It still requires us to understand
what factors serve to undermine the effort of many of Africa's leaders so that
we can move Africa in a constructive direction.
The African historical record has a great deal to do with the trans-
generational instability that Africa has experienced in the post-independence
period. This does not mean that the past rules the future, but it does mean
that the societies that benefited from Africa's tumultuous history cannot say
that they are absolved from Africa's current predicament. It is well known
that the foundation of their prosperity was rooted in part in the African slave
trade. This does not take into account the value of slave labor to Western
economies at the birth of the industrial revolution; King Leopold of Belgium,
for example, created a personal fiefdom over the Congo and established a
regime of murder and brutality that halved the country's population.94 Recent
scholarship demonstrates how the economic, social, and political forces
triggered by "Leopold's Ghost" tends to be a component of the Congo tragedy
today.95 The enlightened Charles de Gaulle, astonished by Ahmed Sekou
Toure's assertion of dignity, required French administrators to remove even
the office furniture when leaving Guinea. 96 The record was simply not a
benevolent one as the approach of independence came along. Thus, history is
a factor, and the players are not exclusively African. It may well be hard to
undo the damage done to Africa without some truth reconciliation and
altruistic assistance from former colonial hegemonies.
A second major factor in Africa's depressing development is the "big man
syndrome;" African "big men" have proved to be men of small vision. Nigeria,
for example, is both blessed and cursed by oil.9 7 Since the 1970s, the
Nigerians pumped $300 billion worth of oil. The chief beneficiaries of the oil
boom were Nigeria's army dictators.98 There are numerous examples of
leaders who seek to control an African state only to exploit that state for their
undivided wealth.
The big man syndrome goes hand-in-hand with corruption. This means
93 See WORLD BANK'S WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001, available at http://web.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20195989-pagePK
:148956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:336992,00.html.
94 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN
COLONIAL AFRICA 233 (1999).
95 JAMES F. CONWAY, AFRICA REAWAKENING: WHAT THE CONTINENT DID WITH INTERNATIONAL
AID 28 (2004).
96 WILLIAM GLENN GARY, GERMANY'S COLD WAR: THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN TO ISOLATE EAST
GERMANY, 1949-1969, at 91 (2003).
97 ALAN H. GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? 229 (1988).
98 KENNETH C. OMEJE, HIGH STAKES AND STAKEHOLDERS: OIL CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN
NIGERIA 27-28 (2006).
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that law is inconvenient and possibly even a form of treason when the big
man seeks to exercise power without restraint. The big man syndrome and
the culture and corruption could not thrive without an international
constituency of supporters and beneficiaries. Thus, the problem cannot be
resolved through solely African internal mechanisms. With regard to
Nigeria's stolen oil money, it is important that there be more transparency
and less secrecy to ensure that the state's stolen heritage might be returned.
This effort will require law reform, international cooperation, and a
willingness to probe and craft claims around which appropriate law and
policy may be developed. It should be noted that according to the African
Union, corruption appropriates one quarter of Africa's gross domestic product
every year, or approximately $148 billion. 99
B. Contemporary Theories of Sustained Deprivation in Africa
There are theorists who argue that many African governments are bad
and that their governing failures are a function of having to manage and rule
countries that are desperately impoverished. Their conclusion is that
desperate poverty breeds bad government. African economic deprivation is
therefore a function of poverty. Because poverty perpetuates bad government,
poverty is sustained. 100 Another view holds that Africa, as a whole, remains
impoverished because of the failures of African politics. African leaders are
seduced by the big man syndrome. It then is in their interests to prevent the
people from improving their economic and political position.10 1
A variation of the above views is attributed to economist Jeffrey Sachs.
Sachs suggests that Africa's economic plight is just a matter of bad luck.102 In
addition to the dysfunctions of badly run governments and endemic poverty,
Africa's geography often brings economic deficits. These deficits include the
soil that produces little food, the vast proliferation of diseases like malaria
and AIDS, the concentration of populations away from the coast, and the lack
of navigable rivers and decent roads. All these geographic deficits hamper the
development of trade and economic growth. Sachs believes that what Africa
needs is the equivalent of a Marshall plan.1
03
Under present conditions, Africans have difficulty accumulating capital.
These physical disabilities of the continent do not exclude the problems of
corruption in the public sphere. But Sachs believes that a Marshall Plan-like
initiation might be necessary to make progress. The Marshall Plan idea is
generally compatible with the millennium goals and the NEPAD agenda. The
99 Global Grease Trade, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2004.
10o HOWARD WHITE & TONY KILLICK, AFRICAN POVERTY AT THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES,
COMPLEXITIES, AND CHALLENGES 30 (2001).
101 Id.
102 Andrew Rice, Why is Africa Still Poor, NATION, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20051024/rice/4.
103 Jeffrey Sachs, Growth in Africa: It Can Be Done, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at 19-21.
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Marshall Plan-like program, if given a serious commitment, might accelerate
the results envisioned in NEPAD. Indeed, a more generous approach to both
trade and aid is better than the current indecision regarding the African
economic situation at the global level. A Marshall Plan-like initiation may
well drive the wheels of the global economy toward a more progressive and
prudential New International Economic Order with a more thoughtful and
penetrating conceptualization of development as a human right. A Marshall
Plan for Africa, a more generous and less grudging trade and aid package, as
well as a realistic approach to crippling debt and its role in sustaining
poverty and bad government, may represent a win-win situation for both the
North and the South.
C Corporate Governance, Ethics, and Corruption:
Lessons from America
The United States is regarded as the leading influence of corporate
culture in economic organization. 104 The United States frequently sets the
standard in the structure and operations of entities in its financial
markets. 10 5 The United States has enormous experience in balancing the
economic freedom of corporations and curbing their potential exploitation of
consumers, investors, and the markets in which they operate. The United
States has been a leader in its jurisprudence of anti-competitive corporate
practices in the field of antitrust. 106 In short, the style and methods of doing
business by U.S. corporations frequently sets the standards of practice and
ethics followed by the rest of the world's business community.
Congress has tinkered with modest reform of corporate governance in an
effort to avoid future Enron-style crises.10 7 The larger impact of the Enron
problem radically eroded public confidence in the market. 108 Corporate
leaders now resist the recent congressional reforms. 109 These leaders
essentially argue that Congress should repeal the rules that facilitate the
chain of decision-making responsibility and mandate transparency because
they pose too great a burden on corporations."10 The problem of the
concentration of economic power in powerful corporate entities is, in fact, an
allocation of power. As antitrust law recognizes, without regulating the power
of a monopoly it will become the foundation of abusive economic power.
104 GARETH MORGAN, IMAGES OF ORGANIZATION 128-29 (1997).
105 KRIS OLDS, GLOBALISATION AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC: CONTESTED TERRITORIES 156 (1999).
106 THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE & DAVID TRUBEK, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 43 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985).
107 ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE AND ASSET PRICING 190 (Luc Renneboog & Piet Duffhues
eds., 2006).
108 LOREN Fox, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 264 (2002).
109 JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 48 (2005).
110 CORPORATE FRAUD RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002, at 150 (William H. Manz ed., 2003).
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Furthermore, the abuse of economic power could have large-scale impacts on
the political and legal cultures of a society and could generate social unrest
and political deterioration.
As Africa moves into the modernization of political economy along neo-
liberal lines, African leaders, especially those in the business and legal
professions, will have to take a hard look at the models of corporate
governance. They will have to ensure responsible exercise of power allocated
to these sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to
prosecute white collar crime.111 For Africa successfully to establish a free
market system, society and the state must invest in policing white collar
crime. The following U.S. corporate reform suggestions may aid Africa in
establishing their free market system:
1. Limit the power of top executives and financial decision-makers who
may have the power to use the corporation for inappropriate ends and for
personal gain;
2. Allow institutional investors, such as pension fund managers, to
nominate independent directors to the boards of the corporations in which
they are major investors;
3. Implement an aggressive program to make employees on all levels
stakeholders in the corporation itself, thus giving them an interest in the
success of the corporation; corporations may achieve this by awarding stock
options to employees as bonuses or rewards for excellent company
performance;
4. Give blue and white collar employees a direct voice in corporate
decision-making to represent the perspectives of professional and non-
professional employees in the business to improve the objectivity and quality
of corporate decision-making;
5. Reduce salary packages and stock options for top-level executives to
avoid artificial inflation of the company's share price; stock options may
remain part of an executive incentive package, but the corporation should
limit their magnitude to protect and enhance corporate interest.
Africa's economic development problems include corporate overreaching.
In South Africa, for example, the public protector found that Petro-South
Africa made questionable payments to Imvume Corp. and required payment
of outstanding amounts due to Petro-South Africa "without delay."'1 2 The
problem gained a certain public notoriety and earned the use of the term
'Oilgate."11 3
11 LEE DRUTMAN & CHARLIE CRAY, THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS: CONTROLLING CORPORATIONS AND
RESTORING DEMOCRACY 197 (2004).
112 Linda Ensor, PetroSA, Imvume Head for Court Over Loan, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Sept. 29, 2006,
at Crime, Law & Justice 3.
113 Vukani Moe & Karima Brown, Scramble to Contain Fallout from Oilgate, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.),
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D. Trade and Development Issues
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has undergone a continuing crisis
of indecision."1 When the WTO admitted third world players to its process, it
had to ensure that third world governments and their advisors understood
the complex rules governing world trade and development.11 5 Thus, the WTO
consistently assumed that third world countries would violate ground rules of
world trade. The experience in the organization and the greatest skill of those
representing the so-called "South" states began to review more critically the
fine print of agreements and regulation to avoid discrimination through the
rules and processes of the WTO. Thus, the "South" began to push for a much
more informed discussion and a more meaningful agenda reflecting its
critical interests. These interests represent Africa's interests as well. The
agenda it put forward contained the following issues:
1. A critical review of the "North" states' agricultural subsidies. The
$353 billion of agricultural subsidies given by the North to its farmers
radically depresses world prices of agricultural commodities critical to Africa;
as a consequence, African produce remains unsubsidized while the North
subsidizes its produce, generating manifestly unfair competition; 1 6
2. A critical review of WTO rules of the past that institutionalized
discriminatory trade consequences for the South;
3. Improved "special and differential treatment" in WTO agreements for
the "South" would permit poorer nations to adjust or generate some flexibility
in the application of WTO agreements;
4. For improved access to the "North" markets, the least developed
countries, including thirty-three in Africa, should be given duty-free rights of
access.
5. Enlarged "Aid for Trade" to facilitate the volume of export to "North"
markets would improve compliance with WTO rules.
These claims were presented to the WTO process during a period
dominated by the mantra of economic liberalization and free trade. The WTO,
while making verbal commitments with some measure of empathy for the
claims of the South, has in effect done very little to advance them politically
or legally. Mr. Tetteh Hormeku of the Third World Network best articulates
the nature of the problem from the African perspective:
Trade liberalization has not been beneficial to African
July 8, 2005, at Crime, Law & Justice 3.
114 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION MILLENNIUM ROUND: FREER TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 36 (Klaus Giinter Deutsch & Bernhard Speyer eds., 2001).
115 PETER VAN DEN BoSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (2005).
116 See ActionAid, Reducing Poverty in a World of Plenty: The Crisis of Aid, in IMPACT OF RICH
COUNTRIES' POLICIES ON POOR COUNTRIES 23, 28 (Robert Picciotto & Rachel Weaving eds., 2004).
Spring 2008]
TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARYPROBLEMS [Vol. 17:413
economies. We have not improved our location in the global
economy. We have not moved out of dependency on primary
commodities. We have not moved into more efficient provision
of manufactured goods and services. We are on the receiving
end of the global economy, which is repatriating our resources
and locking in IMF and World Bank conditionalities through
trade agreements .... What we have at the moment is a trade
paradigm that African countries should open up all sectors of
their economy to foreign providers in a context that destroys
the basis for domestic production and jobs. It can never lead
an African country out of poverty.
117
Economists associated with the World Bank projected that under WTO
policies and in the aftermath of the Doha Declaration, the economies of the
South would generate an enormous amount of wealth, which by 2015 would
make a serious dent in the endemic poverty of the South.11s These figures
have been redefined radically downwards, suggesting that the critics of the
WTO were sensible in their skepticism of its ostensible promises. 119 In short,
it is difficult for Africa to trade its way out of poverty. The resources in the
international community exist to generate more aggressive policies for the
economic transformation of Africa. Mainstream economists suggest that trade
by itself is only weakly related to growth. Economic growth is necessary for
poverty alleviation, but it is not a sufficient condition to get the job done.
Perhaps the best conclusion about the current state of the global trading
regime is the conclusion of Professor Joseph Stiglitz, a former World Bank
Nobel Laureate:
Both as it was conceived, and even more as it has evolved,
today's development round does not deserve its name ....
Many of the issues that it has addressed should never have
been on the agenda of a genuine development round, and
many issues that should have been on the agenda are not....
Those in the developing world who believe that there has
been a history of bargaining in bad faith have a strong case.
120
Conclusions can be drawn from the two illustrations of enterprise
economics in the global system. The major role lawyers play in defining the
maximum freedom for the corporate or entrepreneurial sector indicates that a
117 Michael Fleshman, Trade Talks: Where is the Development, 20 AFR. RENEWAL 14 (2006),
available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol20no1/2Oltradetalks.html (quoting
Tetteh Hormeku).
118 WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL POVERTY 282 (2004).
119 Kym Anderson et al., Global Impacts of the Doha Scenarios on Poverty, WORLD BANK DEV.
RES. GROUP ELECTRONIC NEWSL. (World Bank), Sept. 2005, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Topics/285
6 8 3
1109974429289/Chapterl7_Trade&PovertybookHertel&Winters.pdf.
120 Joseph Stiglitz, The Development Round That Wasn't, ECON. TIMES (India), Dec. 15, 2005.
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corporation with an army of lawyers might fare well in the system.
Conversely, when governments and private sector watchdogs seek to police
the business sector, they often cannot generate the legal muscle to constrain
corporate or economic license. This presents a challenge to the legal
profession and to the teaching of law. An effective and socially responsible
corporate or legal culture may function optimally when it works within a
framework of established rules expeditiously and fairly enforced.
It is hard to imagine a successful capitalist system without an excellent
commercial and corporate legal framework. This framework is in fact a
central feature of a working, dynamic, entrepreneurial system. When the
system works well, the corporate lawyers themselves, within the
corporations, serve as an internal restraint to ensure compliance with the law
and to ensure further that corporate energy and resources are not wasted on
public investigations and possible prosecutions. The WTO system also seems
to have developed without regard to effective input from the lawyers of the
South. When they finally learned the rules of the game, those who benefited
from the unfair system were reluctant to modify the rules sufficiently to
reflect the fundamental policies of world economic order. It is clear, however,
that without a legal framework that is defensible, free trade may become
unfair trade, and grotesque exploitation may lead to conflicts and alienation.
Thus, there must be some circumspection about how the global economic
system appropriately is regulated so that corporate activity falls within the
fundamental norms established by law. There is no obvious or easy answer to
the problem of managing power, material, technological and financial
resources, and common rules that function within and across state lines
without a framework of developed legal expectations. Lawyers must play a
major role in organizing the business of teaching business; they can outline
appropriate legal standards to enhance accountable and responsible
enterprise. In short, the ideological principle that enterprise behavior does
not include social responsibility is no longer tenable. However, this new view
requires more focus on the development of evolving legal rules and principles
that touch on many areas of law-domestic, regional, and international.
IX. MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRIVATIZATION, AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENCE AND WAR
The central point of any constitution is to manage power, prevent
destructive conflict, or channel conflict in ways that are constructive
regarding human values. Thus, war and the institutions of war remain
critical challenges for constitutional stability and the viability of the
constitutional system itself. The League of Nations, with its unanimity rule,
could not constrain state sovereignty in terms of international peace and
security. The Second World War destroyed the League of Nations as an
international constitutional regime. After the War, the U.N. Charter's first
principle was to create a constitutional system that in some measure could
constructively account for the cooperation of the major global powers to
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maintain peace and security.
As we examine the global society in this millennium, we see that the role
of the state globally, while still critically important, has undergone
considerable change. The retreat of state absolutism has tended to enhance
the space for the civil society of business, non-governmental organizations,
individuals, as well as the socially deviant global society. The international
constitutional system is undergoing change. Sometimes change is reflected in
the operational code of rules and understandings in the system. Sometimes
these rules directly conflict with the official rules of the system. Change is
often untidy, and legal scholars and practitioners have a critical role to play
in understanding which changes have become operational laws and which
rules of conventional law have been confirmed or depreciated.
The dynamic aspect of international constitutional law in the global
community today provides an illustration of the challenges emerging in this
millennium. We immediately recognize that there are many more actors than
the state. Often, non-state actors are the most critical factors in the
prescriptive application and enforcement of international human rights law.
The role of civil society has created a virtual global pressure group of human
rights activists. The central element of emerging international constitutional
order is the unruly, often untidy world of civil society.
Scholars interpret the emergence of global civil society as a double-edged
sword. As Professor R. J. Rummel has indicated, the state, with its access to
modern lethal instruments of destruction, has proven to be a vast engine of
mass murder. There is a plea for the relevance of the minimal state. Rummel
indicates that between 1900 and 1980, murder by state and quasi-state
operatives accounted for the deaths of some 180 million people. 121 In short,
concentrating power in the state is dangerous to the existence of humanity.
Conversely, the cluster of interest and pressure groups in civil society are
uneven and unpredictable. While elements of civil society such as Amnesty
International Human Rights Watch are good for humanity, organized crime
and drug-controlled cartels are dangerous. Scholars question whether, as an
ideological matter, allocation of power from the state to the private sector
solves the power problem at all. The almighty state, which lacks checks and
balances or the elements of transparency, responsibility, and accountability,
is indeed a dangerous political artifact. On the other hand, shifting the power
to civil society may not altogether solve the power problem.
One point is very clear: the idea of civil society, viewed from a global
perspective, is to a very large extent viewed as an incipient form of global
democratization. Although, as an ideological construct, it may not prove
sufficiently sensitive to the reality of the distribution of power in the global
civil society, civil society is nonetheless ideologically promoted as a very
121 ROBIN MURPHY WILLIAMS, JR., THE WARS WITHIN: PEOPLES AND STATES IN CONFLICT xii
(2003).
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critical component of an improved world order.
A. Private Military Contractors, Globalism, and World Order
Africa remembers with horror the role of mercenaries 122 running amok
across the continent, spreading chaos in the difficult period of political
transition to independence. Notorious mercenaries, such as Mike Hare and
Bob Denard, seemed to specialize in the overthrow of governments and in the
assassination of political leaders.' 23 Today, South Africa boasts of one of the
prototypes of the modern private military contractor, Executive Outcomes.124
Executive Outcomes does not exist in its original corporate form today.
Rather it has gone global and combined resources and capabilities with
British interests. Executive Outcomes is reported "active all over Africa."'125
The organization seemed particularly interested in performing its services
122 Article 47 of the 1977 Protocol I addition to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines the term
"mercenary" as:
any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in
an armed conflict; b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; c) is
motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict; e) is not a member of the armed forces of
a Party to the conflict and f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party
to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
Protocol Addition to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 13 I.L.M. 1391
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1979), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm. For
another definition of mercenaries, see Fred Schreier & Marina Caparini, Privatizing Security:
Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies, (Geneva Centre for
the Domestic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security-pdf2 5-Schreier-Cap
arini.pdf.
123 ROGER PFISTER, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICAN STATES: FROM PARIAH TO MIDDLE
POWER, 1962-1994, at 34 (2005).
124 "Created in 1989, EO (Executive Outcomes) is an incorporated private security group
registered in Great Britain and South Africa. EO markets its military expertise in achieving
regional security and stability through the deployment of trained and experienced military
personnel." DAVID ISENDBERG, SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE LTD: A PROFILE OF TODAY'S PRIVATE
SECTOR CORPORATE MERCENARY FIRMS (1997), available at http://www.totse.com/en/politics/
us-military/armylove.html (last visited June 7, 2007). The company ceased operations under the
name Executive Outcomes in 1999. See Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law."
Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 535 (2004);
see also South Africa: Executive Outcomes to Terminate its Activities, S. AFR. PRES. ASS'N, Dec.
9, 1998, available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p-product=NewsLibrary&
p-multi=BBAB&d_ place=BBAB&p.theme=newslibrary2&p-action=search&p-maxdocs=200&p_
topdoc=1&p-text direct-O=OF98E7C3A7F38C0&p-field-direct-O=document-id&p-perpage=
10&psort=YMD_ date:D&strackval=GooglePM.
125 GLEN SEGELL, STABILITY AND INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA 28 (1998).
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where the stakes touch on mineral and oil interests. 126
One of the high visibility issues involving private military contractors in
Africa has been tied to the issue of so-called "conflict diamonds" or, more
dramatically, "blood diamonds." Essentially, in African countries with high
intensity conflicts, natural resources such as diamonds may be used to fund
private military operators. These operators may come in to defend the state
or to destroy the government. The government may be a weak democracy or a
vulnerable authoritatorship. The government's detractors similarly may be
movements of liberation or movements concerned with power and privilege
regardless of cost. Countries implicated in the conflict diamonds matter
included Angola, Liberia, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and the Republic of the Congo. In a complex deal encoded in the so-called
Kimberley Process-which is an international intervention involving the
United Nations-the international conglomerates involved in the diamond
industry as well as civil society produced a process designed to remove
conflict diamonds from their role in funding ruthless conflicts on a seemingly
endless timeline. The Kimberley Process requirements are summarized as
follows:
" Each shipment of rough diamonds crossing an
international border must be:
o Transported in a tamper-resistant container.
o Accompanied by a government-validated
Kimberley Process Certificate.
* Each certificate must be resistant to forgery, uniquely
numbered and describe the shipment's contents.
* The shipment can only be exported to another Kimberley
Process participant country.
* It is illegal for uncertified shipments of rough diamonds to
be imported or exported by a Kimberley Process
participant country.
* Failure to comply with these procedures can lead to
confiscation or rejection of parcels and/or criminal
sanctions.
* If any concerns arise regarding a country's adherence to
the Kimberley Process, they are investigated and handled
at an intergovernmental level. 127
126 Id.
127 DiamondFacts.org, Eliminating Conflict Diamonds, http://www.diamondfacts.org/conflictl
eliminating-conflictdiamonds.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). Conflict diamonds came to the
attention of the world media during the extremely brutal conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s.
The United Nations, governments, the diamond industry, and non-governmental organizations
(such as Global Witness, Amnesty International, and Partnership Africa Canada) recognized the
need for a global system to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate diamond
supply chain helping to fund conflict. They developed an agreement called the Kimberley
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Executive Outcomes no longer exists. It has merged into a still larger
operation known as Omega Security. Observers claim that 50 percent of the
private military contractors (PMCs) working in Iraq work for Omega
Security.128 By the time the Iraq war ends, very strong PMCs with close ties
to Africa will have developed. This could have important and under-
appreciated consequences for African security interests. For example, assume
the now well-financed, experienced Omega Security is in search of new
security missions in Africa. Omega might be tempted to engage in activities
that might have a profound impact on the African state system under the
new African Union Constitution. To illustrate this point, assume a minority
dictator emerges in a Southern African state like Lsotho or Botswana. To
maintain power, the dictator might engage an experienced security
organization like Omega to maintain that leader's grip on power in the state.
It is possible to hypothesize a potential threat to South Africa, Africa's most
important democracy.
The private military and security contracting industry today is an
industry experiencing exponential growth and development. 129 Industry
Process. This process requires participating governments to ensure that each shipment of rough
diamonds be exported or imported in a secure container, accompanied by a uniquely numbered,
government-validated certificate stating that the diamonds are from sources free of conflict.
Under the Kimberley Process, diamond shipments can only be exported and imported within
countries which participate in the Kimberley Process. No uncertified shipments of rough
diamonds are permitted to enter or leave a participant's country. This ring-fences conflict
diamonds and ensures they are unable to enter the legitimate diamond supply chain. Thus, they
cannot be used for illegitimate purposes. In November 2002, 52 governments ratified and
adopted the Kimberley Process Certification System. It was fully implemented in August of 2003.
Today, 71 governments, in partnership with the diamond industry and NGOs, are committed
and legally bound to the U.N.-mandated process. Kimberley Process participants currently
account for well over 99 percent of the global production of rough diamonds. Kimberley Process
participants undergo periodic reviews, along with peer monitoring to ensure compliance.
Furthermore, all rough diamond sales are independently audited. They also are subject to
separate governmental regulations. Any country that is found not to be in compliance can be
sanctioned under the Kimberley Process. All participant countries are monitored closely. A
recent Kimberley Process Review Mission to Brazil noted anomalies and weaknesses within the
country's procedures. The Brazilian Government took definitive action by suspending its official
exports of rough diamonds and is in the process of working with the Kimberley Process to
remedy the situation as soon as possible. See id. See also The Kimberley Process, Background,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ background/indexen.html.
128 On Omega Security, see Private Military Contractor, Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/
topic/private-military-company (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
129 CAROLINE HOLMQVIST, PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES THE CASE FOR REGULATION 12 (2005),
available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/SIPRIPolicyPaper9.pdf.
A variety of both demand- and supply-side factors have been associated with
the rise of the current corporate security sphere, although three factors are
most often cited: (a) the dominance of post-cold war free market models of the
state, propelling a strong trend towards the outsourcing of traditional
government functions; (b) the global downsizing of national militaries,
providing a vast pool of trained former military personnel for recruitment by
private companies; and (c) the gradual disengagement of the major powers
from many parts of the developing world.
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leaders maintain that the growth of the industry is a function of identifying
the appropriate market niche. 130 The industry also has been skilled in
sometimes creating its own market or capitalizing on events that may have
market possibilities. The War on Terror, launched by President George W.
Bush after 9/11, has been a boon to the industry. The industry also has
sought to involve itself in humanitarian relief efforts,131 including relief in the
United States. Private military contractors serve governments and
international organizations, as well as humanitarian groups, business
groups, and others. Although we have used the omnibus terms-private
military contractors-they are sometimes described as private military
companies, 132 military service providers, 33 and, more generally, as the
privatized military industry. 134 They can use a corporate business form
135 to
130 Peter W. Singer, The Dogs of War Go Corporate, LONDON NEWS REV., Mar. 19, 2004. "PMCs
now operate in more than 50 countries and do up to $100 billion business a year." Id. A nearly
two-year investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)
reported the existence of at least ninety PMCs that have operated in 110 countries worldwide.
According to Gliising and von Ilsemann, "80 such companies were involved in the Angolan civil
war alone between 1975 and 2003, companies staffed with decommissioned gladiators from all
over the world: French Foreign Legionnaires, South African paratroopers, Ukrainian pilots,
Nepalese Gurkhas." J. Gli.ising & S. von Ilsemann, Gladiators for the Hire, DER SPIEGEL, May 3,
2004.
13, RESETTING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN MILITIARY-HUMANITIARIN
RELATIONS 75 (V. Wheeler & A. Harmer eds., 2006), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/
HPG/papers/hpgreport2l.pdf.
The emerging marketplace of private military provision offers humanitarian
organisations a means to enhance their capacities without turning to
traditional state military assistance. This option is being chosen by
humanitarian clients, albeit very quietly. However, with greater power comes
greater responsibility. The privatised military industry may open up a range
of possibilities, but it also poses some fundamental questions that go to the
heart of the humanitarian identity.
Id. But there is a risk for humanitarian agencies in dealing with PMCs. Id. at 76 (citing an email
correspondence with Doug Brooks, President of the International Peace Operations Association
(IPOA), an association of private contractors, which states that "[t]oo many NGOs would risk
their funding bases if it were publicized that they were working with the peace and stability
industry, no matter what the humanitarian benefits").
132 "The term private military company (PMC) does not exist within any current international
legislation or convention." Schreier & Caparini, supra note 122, at 17.
133 "Companies that provide military services internationally are termed Military Service
Providers. Most MSPs need little if any additional regulation beyond existing commercial laws
since their services are said to be nonviolent and beneficial to humanitarian and international
operations." Id. at 36.
134 Because PMC operations are often controversial, some "prefer to call themselves Security
Company in order to attract less attention from the media, to have a better claim to legitimacy or
less reason to fear regulation." Id. at 18.
135 Ortiz explains:
PMCs might also be considered a result of the expansion of the broader
serurity sector over the last two decades. Both the security and the military
business satisfy a demand for protection. However, this overlapping of
protective functions need not imply that the frameworks established to
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provide services to a global market for which there is considerable demand. 36
A discriminating appraisal of the institution of privatized military actors,
in a historical perspective, demonstrates an astonishing ubiquity in the
conduct of human warfare. Mercenaries and other private forces provided
such services long before the modern state was recognized as a dominant
political construction. 137 Some states specialized in warfare and the sale of
their skills as a means to prosperity. One of the fathers of the French
regulate security firms are effective sanctioning mechanisms for PMCs.
Besides the intrinsic military nature of PMC services, the defensive and
offensive potential delivered or transferred by PMCs distinguishes them from
secutity firms. This requires careful consideration at a time when both
businesses expand and consolidate rapidly. For instance, many security
corporations have expanded their catalogue of services to include the military
element absent in the past. One of the strategies followed has been by way of
taking over PMCs.
Carlos Ortiz, Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding Business of
Commercial Security Provision in GLOBAL REGULATION: MANAGING CRISES AFTER THE IMPERIAL
TURN 205 (2004).
136 MAJ. S. GODDARD, THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY: A LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL ENTITY
WITHIN MODERN CONFLICT (2001), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
report/2001/pmc-legitimate-entity.pdf.
The West became (politically) unwilling to commit and risk its own military
forces in an effort to resolve regional conflicts and humanitarian disasters for
fear again of "crossing the Mogadishu Line." Lacking determined
international action in the form of direct intervention from the West, less
powerful and developed nation-states could not guarantee their own security,
nor provide for and raise effective national armies against interstate wars
and internal civil wars. This situation resulted in an increasing world
demand for PMCs that could create and contribute to nation-states' security.
Id.
137 Mercenaries have existed since at least the Fourteenth Century:
The privatization of conflict is not a new phenomenon; it was widely practiced
until the 1800s. As kings and princes tried to extend their control over new
tracts of land, the feudal system of military service prevented them from
raising the required larger armies. This constraint led them to employ
mercenaries .... The early European use of organized mercenaries was in the
form of private bodies in the 14th century known variously as Free
Companies or Great Companies. These organizations ultimately developed in
Italy as condottieri (literally, military contractors), who offered their services
to the highest bidder. The condottieri system maintained fairly permanent
companies of armed military specialists that were hired out for set periods to
various Italian states. This practice of offering large private armies for hire
flourished through the 17th century. As early as the 15th century, however,
some sovereigns were already finding these large private armies to be a
threat to their own security. As a consequence, they began to integrate
individual mercenaries into their own armies or hire the services of other
army units from another ruler. By the 18th century, this was a fairly common
practice, as the British demonstrated with their use of Hessians to fight in
the American Revolution.
Eugene Smith, The New Condottieri and US Policy. The Privatization of Conl7ict and Its
Implications PARAMATERS, Winter 2002-03, at 104-05 (footnotes omitted), available at
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/O2winter/smith.pdf.
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Revolution said of Prussia that it was "not a state with an army, but an army
with a state."1 38 Indeed, mercenaries fought on the side of George Washington
during the American Revolution. 139 Today, private military contractors are
not simply mercenaries, but a much more complex structure of for-profit
security services. The line between services and actual combat operations
often becomes indistinguishable, and it is sometimes unclear whether private
operators actually are functioning in conventional military roles or whether
their roles are ostensibly distinct.
The U.N. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing, and Training of Mercenaries 140 has not received a great deal of
state support. It intuitively is felt that mercenaries represent unorganized
forces in the international system and contribute to anarchy rather than
stability.14 1 Meanwhile, the trend is to outsource or significantly privatize
138 See PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY 37 (2003) (quoting Marquis de Mirabeau, one of the fathers of the French Revolution).
139 America has a long history of using private contractors to support its military:
Contractors have been routinely operating on our battlefields throughout
most of our recorded history. Factory to foxhole support is not a new
phenomenon. American history is replete with examples of contractor
presence in federal and military operations. It is well documented that our
founding father, George Washington utilized contractors to design and lay
out our nation's capital. During the American Revolution, the Continental
Army was besieged with inefficiencies permeating throughout the logistical
supply system. The leadership sought out solutions to devise an efficient
support infrastructure. So civilians were employed to drive wagons: provide
architectural, engineering, and carpentry services; obtain foodstuffs; and
deliver medical services. Robert Morris, one of the first heads of the Treasury
Department, observed that, 'Experience has sooner or later pointed out that
contracts with private men of substance and talents equal to understanding
as the cheapest, most certain and consequently the best mode of obtaining
those articles, which are necessary for the subsistence, clothing and moving
of any army. The primary mode of land transportation from 1776 until the
1920's was the horse or mule drawn escort wagon. Although it appeared to be
a simple device, the wagon was, in fact, a complex technology that required
the skills of wheelwrights, farriers, blacksmiths, carpenters, and harness
makers to keep it in sound working order. This important tactical
transportation mechanism required the concerted efforts of all those skilled
contract laborers in order to build and maintain them.
MICHAEL MCBRIDE, THE PROLIFERATION OF CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD: A CHANGING
DYNAMIC THAT NECESSITATES A STRATEGIC REVIEW 3 (2003), http://handle.dtic.mi/100.2/
ada415747 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
140 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries, 29 I.L.M. 91 (1990), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/
docs/1989UNConventionEnglish.pdf.
141 Machiavelli wrote:
The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if anyone
supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or
sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold
amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no fear of God, and
keep no faith with men.
[Vol. 17:413
GLOBALISMFROMANAFRICANPERSPECTIVE
military functions for a variety of reasons. In general, democracies tend to
resist compulsory military service and reductions in manpower, suggesting
that outsourcing or privatizing certain military functions are important
strategies for organizing defense. PMCs have been growing in importance in
the current world-order situation, and the industry itself is worth around
$200 billion and is rising. 142 PMCs' services include carrying out risk
appraisals, training local police or paramilitaries, providing site security,
strategic transportation services, intelligence for securing buildings and
facilities in the public and private sphere, supplementing war zone needs,
facilitating weapons procurement, providing logistics and support services for
armed forces (air, sea, and land), providing computer and cyber security,
distributing surveillance propaganda, carrying out covert operations,
providing bodyguards, and destroying weapons systems.
B. The Privatization of the Military and the Changing Role of the State
When Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense for the second time,
he implemented a policy consistent with the Thatcher-Reagan economic
revolution. The economic policy associated with these themes was simply that
any activity engaged in by the state that had economic value and that
conceivably could be done by the private sector should be privatized. The
Rumsfeld version of this idea was that any function involving the military
that could conceivably be done by the private sector should be given to the
private sector to perform as a normal business enterprise. 143 The War on
Terror with its indefinite timeline and its wide-ranging terrain of threat has
proved to be a vital market niche. It has stimulated the industry. Frequently,
such corporations boast of vast numbers of retired military personnel who
NIcCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS 52 (Wayne Rebhorn trans., Barnes &
Noble Classics 2003).
142 "PMCs are involved in practically all aspects of warfare in a global market worth an estimated
$US 200 billion per year." Daniel Lachance, Military Forces for Hire: Is the World Ready to
Privatize Peace? (Apr. 29, 2005) (unpublished research project, Canadian Forces College),
available at http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc31/mds/lachance.pdf. See also JOANNA
SPEAR, FAFO, MARKET FORCES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATY MILITARY COMPANIES,
ECONOMIES OF CONFLICT: PRIVATE SECTOR ACITIVITY IN ARMED CONFLICT, NEW SECURITY
PROGAMME 41 (2006), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/531/531.pdf ("Given the projected
growth in the international trade in private security-annual global revenues are expected to
increase by seven percent annually, reaching $200 billion by 2010.").
143 See Jack M. Bear, Agora: Military Commissions Act of 2006.' The Geneva Boomerang: The
Military Commissions Act of 2006 and US. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM J. INT'L L. 56, 66
n.61 (2007) ("The Pentagon has estimated that there are 100,000 government contractors
operating in Iraq, doing such jobs as serving meals, guarding convoys and interrogating
prisoners." (quoting Griff Witte, New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial, WASH. POST,
Jan. 15, 2007, at Al)). Although then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld defended the extensive use
of private contractors in Iraq by saying it "frees up military personnel in combat zones," there
has been considerable disagreement about what constitutes appropriate "nonmilitary" missions
for these contractors. Peter Spiegel, US. Is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers, L.A.
TIMES, May 24, 2006, at A26; see also William Neikirk, Use of Contractors for Military Purposes
Under Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2004, at C16.
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involve themselves in the functions of the business.144 One U.S.-based PMC
boasts that it has more generals per square foot working for it than the
Pentagon itself.145
The recent trend in the acceleration of Private Military Corporations 46
has generated controversy and complexity about the law that is to control
and regulate these entities. 14 7 The problems sometimes underscore the limits
of national law when the entities work and possible transgressions
internationally.' 48 It is acknowledged widely that national law only weakly
144 See Myriam Gilles, Association of American Law Schools: Private Parties as Defendants in
Civil Rights Litigation: Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1, 6 n.21 (2004). Gilles notes:
Outsourcing of services to the armed forces has been on the rise since the end
of the Cold War and the concomitant downsizing of the world's huge standing
armies. In 1991, the U.S. military numbered 2 million; today, it's 1.5 million.
Thousands of newly unemployed special forces and intelligence officers
signed up with the burgeoning private security industry. The difference is
that a decade ago, the industry was mainly used by multinational
corporations and oil companies operating in high-risk regions. Today, after
9/11 and the war on terror, its biggest client is the Pentagon. There are
hundreds of for-profit companies, mainly American, some British, with about
20,000 personnel in Iraq, doing traditional military work, including
intelligence. That makes private contractors the largest contingent after the
U.S. military, far outnumbering the British forces. Many analysts believe
that it was the under-deployment of troops (only 130,000 were sent, whereas
the military recommended deploying over 250,000) that led to the
unprecedented number of private contractors being used in Iraq.
Id. See also Spencer E. Ante, The Other Army, Bus. WEEK., May 31, 2004, at 76.
145 See Esther Schrader, US. Companies Hired to Train Foreign Armies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2002, at Al.
146 "The increase in the use of PMCs has grown dramatically these last fifteen years. During the
first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor there were 50 military personnel involved. In the
2003 conflict the ratio was 1 to 10." David Isenberg, A Government in Search of Cover: PMCs in
Iraq, British American Security Information Council 5 (Mar. 23-24, 2006), available at
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/pmcs0603.pdf
147 Singer describes some of these complexities:
[Private Military Firms] also create legal dilemmas, the fourth sort of policy
challenge they raise. On both the personal and the corporate level, there is a
striking absence of regulation, oversight, and enforcement. Although private
military firms and their employees are now integral parts of many military
operations, they tend to fall through the cracks of current legal codes, which
sharply distinguish civilians from soldiers. Contractors are not quite
civilians, given that they often carry and use weapons, interrogate prisoners,
load bombs, and fulfill other critical military roles. Yet they are not quite
soldiers, either. One military law analyst noted, "Legally speaking, [military
contractors] fall into the same grey area as the unlawful combatants detained
at Guantinamo Bay."
Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 119, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/ views/articles/fellows/singer2005O3Ol.htm).
148 Indeed, "[m]ilitary privatization entered the popular consciousness in early 2004, when
private contractors working as interrogators and translators for the U.S. government abused
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controls the structure and functions of PMCs.149 Since PMCs are not states, it
is unclear how much international law directly may bind them. Thus, PMCs
generate complex challenges to both national and international law. When
some PMCs become a critical component of a state's war-making arsenal, it is
unclear how far and to what extent corporate decision-makers are bound, if
at all, by the developed strictures of military justice. How far are they bound
by humanitarian and human rights law? What kinds of contracts are
enforceable by such entities and under what law? What (if any) are the limits
of contract law in tasking PMCs in context that makes it difficult to
differentiate between combat and security activity?
C. Private Military Contractors (PMCs) in Iraq
PMCs represent the second largest contingent of actors inside Iraq
today.1 50 The United States and the United Kingdom are the most developed
in this area and have captured some 70 percent of the global market. South
Africans and Israelis also figure prominently in some situations. The modern
growth of PMCs directly was tied to the aggressive development of the neo-
liberal economics by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald
Reagan in the United States. By downsizing government, economic
opportunities were generated for the private sector to fill in the gap created
by deregulation.1 51 At the end of the Cold War, the mantra of reform of the
military, at least in the United States, resulted in a significant downsizing of
the Pentagon. Whatever could be allocated to the private sector, within the
law, would be allocated to the private sector.
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq." Laura Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized
World, 31 YALE INT'L L. 383, 385 (2006) (citing Douglas Jehl & Kate Zernike, Greater Urgency on
Prison Interrogation Led to the Use of Untrained Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at All).
For another recent example, see also Steve Fainaru, Four Hired Guns in an Armored Truck,
Bullets Flying, and a Pickup and a Taxi Brought to a Halt, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, at A1.
149 "Because of the instability of the judicial systems in foreign countries such as Afghanistan and
Iraq and the lack of adequate legal protections, foreign courts in those countries do not hold
much promise as a suitable venue for trying U.S. civilians accused of abusing detainees." Ryan P.
Logan, The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005; Embodying US. Values to Eliminate Detainee
Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1605, 1620 (2006).
150 "By some estimates, more than 20,000 security contractors operate in Iraq-a private army
that is the second-largest armed foreign contingent in the country, surpassed only by the 140,000
U.S. troops." T. Christian Miller, Contractors Say Marines Behaved Abusively, L.A. TIMES, June
11, 2005, at Al.
151 According to Joanna Spear:
A second strucural factor behind the rise of PMCs is the post-Cold War draw-
down of armed forces and the end of apartheid-driven conflicts in Africa,
which has led to a glut of trained manpower. According to the Bonn
International Conversion Centre, the world's armies shrank by over six
million soldiers between 1987 and 1996. The downsizing of the 1990s has also
contributed to a general trend from public to private service of skilled
soldiers.
SPEAR, supra note 142, at 12.
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Those with connections and influence with the military-industrial elite
benefited. Downsizing thus became a significant allocation of public funds to
well-connected private sector interests. Most recently, by creating a vast
homeland security budget, the United States also has created an enormous
pork barrel for the private sector. In response, governmental officials who
crafted the national security rules have been leaving the government in
droves to set up private security consultancies or to join pre-existing private
security corporations. 1
52
The nature of the business does not lend itself to levels of transparencies
that approximate the levels of normal corporate actors. 153 To provide one
illustration of the problem, former contractors and survivors of a failed PMC
operation in Iraq have sued Blackwater USA, a PMC engaged in
transportation security work. Properly-trained military decision-makers
152 Schreier and Caparini describe this phenomenon:
[O]n taking office, Cheney named executives from leading military
contractors as heads of the three services. James Roche, the secretary of the
Air Force, is a former vice president of Northrop Grumman; Gordon England,
the secretary of the Navy, is a former executive at General Dynamics; and
Thomas P. White, a former secretary of the Army, came from Enron. A recent
study of defense contracting in the U.S. identified 224 high-ranking
government officials over the past seven years who moved into the private
sector to work as lobbyists, board members or executives of contractors.
Moreover, at least one-third of these former high-ranking government
employees had held positions that allowed them to influence government
contracting decisions. A survey of the revolving door phenomenon concluded
that "the revolving door has become such an accepted part of federal
contracting in recent years that it is frequently difficult to determine where
the government stops and the private sector begins. The rapid growth of
outsourcing and the private military industry in the US has strengthened
and accelerated the revolving door between the Pentagon and industry.
Typically, the large PMCs count many former military personnel as
employees. The reputation that retired officers built while in public service
may cause government officials, as well as members of the legislature, to give
undue credence to their lobbying efforts. The report recommended
simplification of the complex laws and regulations on post-government
employment (which also contain significant loopholes for high-ranking
government officials in policy positions) and more oversight.
Schreier & Caparini, supra note 122.
153 Reliance on Private Military Contractors in Iraq Reconstruction, Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (opening statement of Henry A.
Waxman, Rep.).
We know that the war in Iraq has given private contractors an
unprecedented role in providing security services. Almost $4 billion in
taxpayer funds has been paid for private security services in the
reconstruction effort alone. But sorting out overhead, subcontracts,
subsubcontracts, profit, and performance has been nearly impossible .... It's
remarkable that the world of contractors and subcontractors is so murky that
we can't even get to the bottom of this, let alone calculate how many millions
of dollars taxpayers lose in each step of the subcontracting process.
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should have known of the danger. The company's transportation operatives
were sent on a dangerous route in Fallujah. Moreover, the company's
personnel were sent into a danger zone without adequate military equipment
for protection. Several transport workers were killed, triggering the first
battle of Fallujah. 154
One of the victims wrote home about the company's incompetence and
malfeasance. It is alleged that his death is attributable to the corporation's
ineptitude. 155 One must inquire about the PMCs' competence to train people
to defend themselves, while avoiding harm to others. However, PMCs now
represent a type of organization within the twilight zone of international
regulation. It is not clear what national rules of engagement apply to them in
terms of different arenas of involvement or engagement of conflict. According
to various watch facilities, at least ninety companies provide services that
normally would be provided by the state military establishment. They
function in approximately 110 countries, but the level of public accountability
for their conduct, either nationally or internationally, is unclear. It is possible
that the only constraint on their activity is either what their market will bear
or what they will get away with.
Today, the Pentagon does not know how many PMC contracts it has or
with whom. What is known is that the contracts are for billions of dollars. 156
Haliburton, Kellogg, Brown, and Rought have had long-standing contracts
154 Id. Rep. Waxman recounted:
On March 31, 2004, four Americans working as private security personnel for
Blackwater, all of whom were military veterans, were ambushed and killed in
Fallujah while on a protection mission. Their tragic death became a turning
point in public opinion about the war and directly resulted in a major U.S.
military offensive, which is known as the First Battle of Fallujllah. Twenty-
seven American soldiers and over 800 insurgents and Iraqi civilians died in
that battle, and military observers believe it helped fuel an escalation of the
insurgency.
Id.
155 Id. ("The day before the four soldiers were killed, a Blackwater employee sent an e-mail
alerting superiors that a lack of equipment, armored vehicles, and other safety equipment left
the team unprepared to begin its mission. That warning was seemingly ignored and we need to
explore that further.").
156 Schreier and Caparini explain:
In 2003, Halliburton's Pentagon contracts increased from $900 million to $3.9
billion, a jump of almost 700 percent. The company now has over $8 billion in
contracts for Iraqi rebuilding and Pentagon logistics work in hand, and that
figure could hit $18 billion if it exercises all of its options. Computer Sciences
Corporation, which does missile defence work and also owns DynCorp, a
private military contractor whose work stretches from Colombia to
Afghanistan and Iraq, saw its military contracts more than triple from 2002
to 2003, from $800 million to $2.5 billion. And Iraq contracts have boosted the
annual revenue of British-based PMCs alone from $320 to more than $1.7
billion.
Schreier & Caparini, supra note 122, at 34 (footnote omitted).
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with the Pentagon. Earlier numbers indicate that Kellogg and Booz Allen
Hamilton had a contract worth approximately $300 billion. Figures show that
between 1998 and 2003, the Pentagon awarded some $47 billion for small
business companies for the provision of services. In the year 2010, Homeland
Security is projected budget is approximately $130 billion. It also has
developed a constituency of security of PMCs to perform its functions.
157
D. Politics and Private Military Contractors (PMCs)
One of the main problems with the use of PMCs is the level of control
exercised over them in situations where they may deploy force directly or
indirectly. Another problem with the PMC industry is political. As a
constituency, PMCs have become so powerful that they have contributed
millions to presidential and congressional campaigns in order to muster
support for their security operations. 158 If we accept the fact that
deregulation of security and political economy are weakening the state, then
the principles of good governance and democracy become weak if the state
cannot regulate activities touching upon the central values of the community.
How are we to account for the allocation of state functions that encroach upon
the deployment of force, or the selective support in the deployment of force, or
which may act covertly on behalf of the one who pays the highest price?
As earlier indicated, the allocation of competence to the private sector in
the sphere of coercion and the use of force particularly may be difficult in
African nations attempting to build sustainable states. These efforts may be
frustrated by the neutral PMC factor, undermining a crucial component of
state security: the predictability of future threats and the capacity to manage
them. This may be one of Africa's most important issues in a post-Iraq global
system rife with private armies and private military contractors.
I would suggest that when we compare the financial side of the global
system with the security side, then we see that there are important
structural changes occurring. Those changes will not be neutral. They are
generating or staking claims over what is licit and appropriate for the
international environment. Implicit in what is presented is a normative
scenario seeking to establish its efficacy as the living law of the international
community as contrasted with the ineffective law on the books in the U.N.
Charter and allied instruments. There is no luxury here of a legal vacuum.
On the contrary, it is important to defend the values of the current Charter
system and to consider reform of the Charter in order to rationally account
for modern problems and modern challenges that require innovation and
creativity to fulfill the Charter's purpose.
167 Id. at 22.
158 Id. at 70 n.226 ("[Seventeen) of the nation's leading PMCs have invested more than $16
million in congressional and presidential campaigns since 1999.").
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X. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have focused not on the formal rules of international
economic order or the control and regulation of coercion in the international
system, but rather on the forces that are pressurizing the international
system and staking claims for an important rearrangement of the control and
regulation of power and wealth. These claims are supported by powerful
ideologies which hold that the state concentrates power in ways that are both
lethal and often economically inefficient. Thus, the solution is developing
private power through national and global privatization policies and
practices.
Extreme concentrations of state power result in the abuse of power.
Extreme concentrations of power in the private sector move power outside the
law or may simply erode the power of law. Globalism complicates these
issues, but they are real and have to be understood. In this arena of global
complexity, the legal profession and the juris consults play an important role.
If we, juris consults, can agree on anything, it is that it is better that power
be constrained by law than by brute force.
Thus, scholars and teachers should focus on practical applications of the
law in addition to developing an articulate legal ideology that is morally
justifiable, analytically rigorous and truthful, and appropriate for community
stabilization. Rules of contract, delict, property, agency, partnership, and
others over time have moderated the effects of political upheaval and have
stood the test of facilitating social good in periods of tranquility. That is the
kind of challenge that we grapple with in our time. Africa, and poor regions
in general, desperately need equal protection against public and private
predators.
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